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SUPREME COURT VOTING PATTERNS RELATED
TO JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
John R. Leathers*
The past decade of development by the United States Supreme Court of
constitutional law related to jurisdiction has been one of amazingly swift
occurrences. Although progress in the area has traditionally been glacial,
the Court has produced a consistent flow of opinions over the last ten years.
With the flow has come a virtual flood of commentary.1 A consensus is
emerging among scholars, 2 perhaps shared by some members of the
Court, 3 that the current developmental framework for judicial jurisdiction
dating from International Shoe Co. v. Washington4 may be ripe for revamp-
ing, and that the process may produce a new framework. I will not join that
debate except to comment on the excellence of the ideas expressed, and to
voice my own hope that some philosophical advance is at hand. Indeed, if
one looks at what the cases of the past decade have done, as opposed to
what they have said, it is possible that the advance has already taken place.
As I reviewed the cases of the past decade, however, I was perplexed by
the directions the various members of the Court were taking. I thought that
some of the justices' opinions were inconsistent, and were at odds with
their votes in cases where they had not written opinions. I also thought it
possible that subtle changes were occurring, in result if not in rationale.
The intent of this article is to examine the voting records of the individual
justices in the jurisdiction cases. It will emphasize their written opinions,
examining their expressed preferences and philosophies, and the nature of
the votes they cast in the cases, regardless of their written opinions or lack
* On leave Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. Partner, Frost & Jacobs, Lexington,
Kentucky. B.B.A., 1968, University of Texas (El Paso); J.D., 1971, New Mexico; LL.M., 1973,
Columbia University.
1. So much of what has been written is excellent that I would not presume to think that I could add
significantly to the scholarly commentary which has been published on the various cases as they
emerged from the Court. Among those articles I have found personally to be most helpful and
imaginative are: Lewis, A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under Uniform
Standards, 37 VAliD. L. REV. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Lewis, A Brave New World]; Lewis, The Three
Deaths of State Sovereignty' and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdic-
tion, 58 NoTRE DAMEL. REv. 699 (1983) [hereinafter Lewis, The ThreeDeaths]; Redish, Due Process,
Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112 (1981);
Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the PersonalJurisdiction of State Courts: Time for Change, 63
OR. L. REv. 485 (1984).
2. See Lewis, A Brave New World, supra note 1; Weintraub, supra note 1.
3. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 307-08 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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thereof. I hope that the pattern that emerges will provide a means of
predicting the future behavior of the Court. My analysis will also reveal the
current status of the law on these points.
CASES AND CONCEPTS TO BE REVIEWED
The development of due process controls on judicial jurisdiction began,
as every first year law student knows, with Pennoyer v. Neff 5 Whatever may
have been the legitimacy of applying the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to a fact pattern which arose before the effective date of
the amendment, 6 the time has long since passed when that technicality is of
any relevance. Since Pennoyer in 1877, the due process clause has been
consistently interpreted as a limitation on state court judicial jurisdiction,
leaving the Court and scholars to define the nature and dimensions of the
control imposed. As originally formulated, due process control on judicial
jurisdiction protected both the "fundamental fairness" rights of defendants
and the sovereignty interests of states other than the forum. Recently,
however, it appears that only the "fairness" aspect of judicial jurisdiction
remains; sovereignty as a dimension of judicial jurisdiction appears to be
defunct. 7
This article will focus primarily on the judicial jurisdiction cases since
Shaffer v. Heitner.8 Although it involves discovery sanctions rather than
true judicial jurisdiction, Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee9 will also be discussed, because its treatment of the
sovereignty aspect of jurisdiction is significant. Finally, Hanson v. De-
nckla l0 will be discussed. Although Hanson predates Shaffer by almost two
decades, its significance is still considerable.
5. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
6. Lewis, The Three Deaths, supra note 1, at 703 n.21.
7. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n. 10
(1982); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.13 (1985). This development was
advocated in Redish, supra note 1, and is discussed at length in Lewis, The Three Deaths, supra note 1,
and Weintraub, supra note 1. The combination of fairness and sovereignty in the judicial jurisdiction
restrictions of due process emerged in Pennoyer v. Neff probably because the Court used precedents
drawn from the area of full faith and credit to sister state judgments. While the enforcement of sister
state judgments may have been the most analogous precedent available in Pennoyer's time, the analogy
is imperfect, and may have resulted in the application of a concept which should have had no relation to
judicial jurisdiction.
8. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). This line of cases includes: Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 107 S.
Ct. 1026 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783
(1984); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
9. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
10. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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The discussion will also include references to the voting records of the
justices in cases dealing with choice of law. Both the due process clause"
and the full faith and credit clause' 2 of the United States Constitution
furnish some broad control over the ability of a state to choose the law
applicable to the merits of a controversy. To distinguish that control from
the judicial jurisdiction control embodied in cases like International Shoe,
it is convenient to refer to the control of choice of law, whether by due
process or full faith, as a control of "legislative jurisdiction."
Choice of law control is primarily a restriction on state sovereignty;
phrased alternately, it requires states to recognize the sovereignty of other
states or other countries. Choice of law control also relates to the funda-
mental fairness idea that is central to the control of judicial jurisdiction.
With the demise of the sovereignty aspect in the judicial jurisdictional field,
the Court may in the future regulate sovereignty solely through legislative
jurisdiction controls. Although the Court has often denied any connection
between the concepts of judicial and legislative jurisdiction, 13 its treatment
of the concepts seems more realistic in its most recent decisions. 14
The concepts of judicial and legislative jurisdiction logically must be
approached together to determine the Supreme Court's attitudes toward
constitutional restrictions on the civil adjudicatory processes of the states.
In order to view that relationship, the discussion of the judicial jurisdiction
cases from Hanson to Asahi15 will include the following legislative juris-
diction cases: Nevada v. Hall, 16 Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 17
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 18 and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.19
11. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
12. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
13. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253-54 (1958). In both cases, the majority of the Court indicated that a forum which lacked judicial
jurisdiction (Florida and Delaware, respectively) would nevertheless have been allowed to apply its own
law to govern the merits of the action. Similarly, one would conclude that (in each instance) the forum
finally secured for adjudication of the controversies could have chosen to apply the law of those other
states to the merits. Such comments by the Court never seemed to me particularly persuasive. In
Hanson I have attributed any supposed dichotomy to the fact that Florida was attempting to exercise
judicial jurisdiction over what seemed a tenuously related and unnecessary party-the Delaware
trustee. In Shaffer, it has always seemed wrong to me that Delaware lacked sufficient contacts with the
absent directors and officers; thus, the conclusion that Delaware law would govern the merits (whether
in a Delaware forum or elsewhere) hardly seems surprising.
14. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462,481-82 (1985). The facts inBurgerKing could not actually give rise to any such problem.
The case involved a choice of law clause in a written contract; any forum would undoubtedly have
therefore chosen to apply Florida law.
15. See supra note 8.
16. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
17. 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
18. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
19. 472 U.S. 787 (1985).
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The legislative jurisdiction cases are important because, after decades of
relative inactivity, this control is gaining significance-perhaps in reaction
to the pro-forum nature of the choice of law systems that have evolved in
most states since the original Supreme Court decisions in the area during
the 1930's.
With the reemergence of legislative jurisdiction controls and the demise
of state sovereignty as an aspect of the judicial jurisdiction control, we are
witnessing the development of a new, dual constitutional requirement for
state adjudication in multi-jurisdiction fact patterns. The current character
of that system can be deduced by examining the development of judicial
and legislative jurisdiction from Hanson through Asahi.20
JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION CASES
The decision in Hanson v. Denckla2' was prompted by conflicting
decisions in the Florida and Delaware court systems. The litigation in both
states involved the validity of a trust executed by a domiciliary of Pennsyl-
vania. After establishing the trust using a Delaware trustee, the Pennsyl-
vania settlor moved to Florida, where she later died, leaving a will purport-
ing to exercise a power of appointment retained under the trust. Litigation
broke out in Florida between two groups of family members. One group
maintained that the trust was invalid; hence, no power of appointment could
be executed and the corpus of the trust would pass to them under the
residuary clause of the will. The competing group sought to uphold the
trust so that the power of appointment would pass the property to them. For
no particularly sound reason, Florida law made the trustee an indispensable
party to the litigation. A contest ensued over whether the Delaware trustee
was subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida. In the end, the Florida
courts held that the trustee was subject to jurisdiction. During the pendency
of the Florida litigation, an action was commenced in Delaware to deter-
mine the validity of the trust. After the Florida decree invalidating the trust
was entered, it was argued that the judgment was entitled to full faith and
credit in Delaware. Nevertheless, the Florida decree was ignored in Dela-
ware on the grounds that Florida had no jurisdiction over the Delaware
trustee.
After reviewing the inconsistent opinions of Florida and Delaware on the
jurisdictional issue, the Supreme Court concluded that no such jurisdiction
had been available in Florida. Thus, the Florida judgment violated due
process as it related to the trustee (and was indeed invalid under Florida law
as to all parties due to the lack of an indispensable party); as such, it was not
20. See supra note 8.
21. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
634
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entitled to full faith and credit in Delaware. The vote in the Supreme Court
was very close: five to four. A dissent was written by Justice Douglas;22 a
separate dissent was written by Justice Black,23 and concurred in by
Justices Burton and Brennan.
Of the justices who made up the Court at the time of Hanson, only
Justice Brennan remained a figure in developments which began almost
twenty years later in Shaffer v. Heitner.24 Shaffer was a shareholder's
derivative action brought in Delaware against a Delaware corporation and
its officers and directors for alleged mismanagement of the company. None
of the named officers and directors were residents of Delaware, and no
section of the Delaware long-arm statute as it then existed brought them
within the personal jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction in the case was
sought by plaintiffs on a quasi in rem theory, using Delaware's sequestra-
tion provisions to attach the stock or stock options that the defendants held
in Greyhound Corporation. By that device, plaintiffs successfully obtained
limited jurisdiction over some twenty-one of the twenty-eight individuals
who were named as defendants. The Supreme Court, in a landmark
decision striking down the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction, which had been
a fixture since Harris v. Balk,25 held that a state could not exercise even
limited jurisdiction unless a defendant whose property was attached had
contacts with the forum sufficient to satisfy the due process standards of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.26 Although the reasoning of the
Court majority beyond that point is far from clear, the bottom line is that
Delaware's assertion of jurisdiction was constitutionally impermissible,
presumably because the defendant directors lacked minimum contacts with
Delaware. 27 In addition to breaking a long drought in Supreme Court
treatment of the area, the opinion in Shaffer was only the beginning of what
would be a virtual flood of opinions dealing with jurisdictional issues.
Within a year after its decision in Shaffer, the Court again addressed the
constitutional dimensions of personal jurisdiction, in Kulko v. Superior
Court.28 The issue in Kulko was whether California could exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident father for the purpose of modifying a prior
22. Id. at 262 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 256 (Black, J., dissenting).
24. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
25. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
26. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
27. The separate opinion of Justice Brennan is most persuasive. It argues that corporate officers and
directors should be subject to claims on behalf of the corporation in the state of incorporation. Shafferv.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 222 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For an
extended discussion of the issue, see Leathers, Substantive Due Process Controls of Quasi In Rem
Jurisdiction, 66 Ky. L.L 1 (1977).
28. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
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custodial agreement of the parties and setting child support. 29 Although the
father and his ex-wife married in California, California had never been the
marital domicile. Both parties had only transient connections with Califor-
nia prior to their divorce. After the divorce, however, the wife resided in
California. She had custody of the two children during school vacations and
during the summers, and received child support while the children stayed
with her. The father had voluntarily allowed one of the children to live with
the mother in California permanently; the other child went to California
without the knowledge or consent of the father. The California courts
asserted jurisdiction over the father based on his agreement to let one child
live in California. Jurisdiction over the claim involving the other child was
carried along under some sort of ancillary jurisdictional argument. The
Supreme Court held that the factual connections were insufficient, under
Hanson v. Denckla,30 to show that the father had purposefully availed
himself of the benefits and protections of California. Thus, he was not
subject to jurisdiction.
In Nevada v. Hall,31 the Court was faced with the first of the choice of law
cases. The claim, litigated in California, concerned the personal injuries of
California residents for an automobile accident which occurred in Califor-
nia. There was no doubt as to personal jurisdiction over the tortfeasor; that
conclusion would have been reached under the earliest nonresident
motorist statutes. The complicating factor was that the driver of the vehicle
injuring the plaintiffs was an employee of the University of Nevada, an
instrumentality of the state. Nevada admitted in the litigation that the
vehicle in question was owned by the state, and that the driver was an
employee of the university acting within the scope of his official duties. The
issue was whether Nevada's sovereign immunity law applied, thus limiting
the award to $25,000 per claimant, 32 or whether the California rule abso-
lutely waiving the defense of sovereign immunity applied, thus allowing
unlimited damages, subject only to normal considerations of proof. The
California courts applied California law, rejecting Nevada's argument
based on the full faith and credit clause;33 a jury verdict in excess of one
million dollars resulted. The Supreme Court held that it was constitu-
tionally permissible for California to apply its own law, on the ground that
federal law would not require California to defer its legitimate interest in
29. The issue was solely constitutional. It lacked the usual statutory component of such cases
because the California long-arm statute was coextensive with the constitutional control of due process.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 410.10 (West 1973).
30. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
31. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
32. NEV. REv. STAT. § 41.035(1) (1977).
33. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
636
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parties injured within its boundaries to the conflicting policies of a sister
state, even where the sister state's policy touched upon an issue as funda-
mental as sovereign immunity and where the recovery would be payable by
that sister state.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson involved application of long-
arm jurisdiction in the relatively difficult area of products liability.34 In
World-Wide Volkswagen the regional distributor and retailer of an auto-
mobile had been joined with the importer and manufacturer in a suit arising
from an alleged design defect in the automobile. Oklahoma was the scene
of a rear-end collision in which the plaintiffs' car burst into flames. The
automobile had been manufactured in Germany, imported into the United
States by one of the defendants, distributed through a defendant which was
essentially a wholesaler, and sold by the defendant retailer to the family of
plaintiffs. At the time of the purchase, plaintiffs were New York residents.
They were passing through Oklahoma on their way to a new home in
Arizona at the time of the crash. The defendant wholesaler was incorpo-
rated in New York, and serviced a network of retailers in New York, New
Jersey and Connecticut; the defendant retailer was a New York corporation
and had its only place of business in New York.
Despite the argument (thought persuasive by the dissent) that an auto-
mobile is such a unique and mobile product that its sellers ought to be
subject to jurisdiction in any place where the product caused an injury, the
majority of the Court held that the wholesaler and retailer were not subject
to jurisdiction in Oklahoma. The Court focused rigidly upon the contacts of
each of the defendants separately, concluding that neither the wholesaler
nor the retailer purposefully availed themselves of the benefits and protec-
tions of Oklahoma law. While at first blush the Court's analysis may appear
unduly restrictive, 35 it is important to remember that the most significant
defendant-the manufacturer-was clearly subject to the jurisdiction of
the Oklahoma courts. Thus, the plaintiffs were probably left with consider-
ably more than half a loaf in terms of their still-pending litigation.
On the same day that the Court handed down the decision in World-Wide
Volkswagen, it also rendered a long-awaited decision on the status of quasi
in rem jurisdiction over liability insurance policies in the aftermath of
34. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
35. The Court employed a two-prong test for establishing judicial jurisdiction, although under the
facts of the case the second prong was not reached. The Court discussed "two related, but distinguisha-
ble functions," 444 U.S. at 291-92, indicating that even if there were no violation of fairness, due
process as a control over state sovereignty could in some circumstances deprive a forum of jurisdiction.
Id. at 294. Compare Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), discussed infra at notes
54-56 and accompanying text.
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Shaffer v. Heitner.36 In the case of Rush v. Savchuk,37 the Court struck
down the attachment of such policies for jurisdictional purposes.38 In Rush,
the Minnesota plaintiff invoked quasi in rem jurisdiction over an Indiana
resident for a claim arising from an automobile accident that occurred in
Indiana. Although the plaintiff was a Minnesota resident at the time he filed
the action, he had been an Indiana resident at the time the claim arose. 39
The Indiana defendant was covered by a liability insurance policy issued by
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., a corporation which did
business in both Indiana and Minnesota.40 Predictably, the defendant
tortfeasor in Rush was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Minnesota;
jurisdiction was asserted quasi in rem through the attachment of his liability
policy. The Court applied the rationale of Shaffer, holding that since the
defendant himself could not be subjected to jurisdiction in Minnesota,
neither could his "property" be subjected to attachment in Minnesota.
In Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.,4 the Court faced the issue of
whether an injured employee who recovered workers' compensation benefits
in the state of his injury could subsequently recover a supplemental award
under the law of the state where he had been employed. In an interesting and
complex opinion, the Court held that an employee could make such addi-
tional recovery, thus preserving his choice after receipt of an award, just as it
would have been his option to choose in which forum to assert his claim
initially. The decision limited the preclusive effect of the first forum's work-
ers'compensation award upon subsequent proceedings in another forum. 42
36. 433 U.S. 186 (1976).
37. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
38. The device had been most famous under the New York version, as set forth in Seider v. Roth, 17
N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966), 269 N.Y.S.2d 99.
39. Rush, 444 U.S. at 322.
40. And, it must be supposed, everywhere else in the United States as well, a factor which may have
had considerable bearing on the outcome of the case.
41. 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
42. The decision in Thomas laid to rest the long-standing dichotomy between Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943), and Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947). In
Magnolia Petroleum and McCartin, the Court was faced wfth fact patterns in which persons covered by
workers' compensation insurance were employed in one state and injured in another. In both cases, the
injured worker received full benefits under the law of one state and then sought a supplementary
recovery under the law of the second state. Under normal application of res judicata, the rights of the
injured worker would have been merged into his recovery in the first state, and Magnolia Petroleum so
held. Recovery in the second state was denied, on the ground that to grant a supplemental recovery
violated the full faith and credit requirements regarding the award in the first state. 320 U.S. at 444. That
position was modified-and perhaps destroyed-by the holding in McCartin that the first award had a
preclusive effect in the second state only if there was "unmistakable language" in the first award to
indicate an intent to preclude a second award. 330 U.S. at 628. In the absence of such language, the first
award was not preclusive. Given the common lack of such language (either in the award itself or in the
statutes of the first state), the McCartin exception became as a practical matter the rule, and Magnolia
Petroleum became the exception.
638
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Almost one year after the decisions in World-Wide Volkswagen and
Rush, the Court addressed the constitutional dimensions of legislative
jurisdiction in the case of Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague.43 The case
involved a wrongful death action in Minnesota arising out of an accident in
Wisconsin. Minnesota had been the place of employment of the decedent, a
Wisconsin domiciliary, and the domicile of the decedent's widow at the
time the suit was filed. Allstate Insurance did business in Minnesota and,
one would suppose, everywhere else in the United States as well. The
decedent's automobiles had been insured in Wisconsin and the accident
causing his death had occurred in Wisconsin. The issue was whether
Minnesota could apply its rule of "stacking" uninsured motorist
coverages. Aggregating the contacts, the Court concluded that the connec-
tion with the forum was sufficient to allow Minnesota to apply its own law
to the merits of the case. Application of Minnesota law neither violated due
process nor any full faith and credit owing to the law of Wisconsin.
A crucial matter relating to constitutional controls on judicial jurisdic-
tion appeared almost as an aside in the 1982 case of Insurance Corp. of
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee.44 The holding is interesting
but basically unrelated to the scope of this article. Several defendants had
asserted lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense to an action brought in a
federal court in Pennsylvania. In the course of the discovery proceedings on
the jurisdictional defenses, several of the defendants disobeyed discovery
orders of the trial court and failed to produce documents and records
relevant to the existence of personal jurisdiction. Following a period of
skirmishing common to discovery resistance cases, the defendants were
warned that if they continued to disobey, the court would impose personal
jurisdiction over the defendants as a sanction. The defendants continued
their disobedience, and an order finding jurisdiction was entered. Appeal to
the Supreme Court was taken on the issue of whether such a sanction was
permissible under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A). In uphold-
ing the sanction-an eminently logical conclusion-the Court reflected in
a footnote on a hotly contested judicial jurisdictional issue.45 In that
footnote, Justice White seemingly repudiated some of his earlier opinions.
He stated that, as a control of judicial jurisdiction, the function of the due
process clause was simply to insure basic fairness to defendants, and that it
had no component related to the sovereignty of the forum state or sister
states. 46 Should that position be adhered to, one aspect of the rationale of
43. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
44. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).




Pennoyer v. Neff47 will finally be laid to rest. The troublesome problems of
federalism, which were imported into the judicial jurisdiction cases, will
be cast out of such cases and reserved for treatment by the Court in some
other fashion.
In 1984, two cases decided together eliminated any suggestion that state
exercises of judicial jurisdiction might be subject to additional constitu-
tional limitations from sections of the Constitution other than the due
process clause. In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,48 the plaintiff, a New York
resident, brought a libel suit in New Hampshire. The Court held that
Hustler Magazine's regular circulation in the state was sufficient to support
an assertion of jurisdiction. The Court reaffirmed its position that the
adequacy of jurisdictional contacts depended on the relationship of the
defendant to the forum, not on some connection with the plaintiff or the
claim asserted.49 In Calder v. Jones,50 the plaintiff sued a nonresident
newspaper reporter and editor for libel in a California court. The Supreme
Court held that, where the plaintiff lived and worked in the forum, the
jurisdiction of the forum over a defamation claim was not limited to the
publisher but extended to the author and editor as well.
Prior to the holdings in Keeton and Calder, there had been some
suggestion that states with otherwise sufficient contacts were subject to
additional limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction due to the first amend-
ment. 51 In both cases, the Court held that states which would otherwise
have sufficient contacts for an exercise of judicial jurisdiction were not
deprived of power over defamation cases by concern for the freedom of the
press. Once that conclusion was reached, both cases presented rather
ordinary fact patterns, clearly supporting the existence of jurisdiction. In
combination, the two cases also seem significant in that they continued the
tendency of the Court to deal with judicial jurisdiction as a matter separate
from other aspects of cases (most notably, legislative jurisdiction) and to
retain emphasis on defendant contacts rather than on other factors.
The Court once again denied state court jurisdiction in Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.52 The case involved a wrongful
47. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
48. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
49. Left for later decision was the issue of whether the forum (New Hampshire) could apply its
statute of limitations to the claim of the nonresident plaintiff. The issue was crucial since the New
Hampshire statute appeared from the decision to be the only one in the United States which would not
have barred the claim.
50. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
51. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Conner, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966); Buckley v. New York
Times Co., 338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964). One must wonder whether the timing of those cases and the
political and social setting in which they occurred may not have contributed much to the circuit court
holdings set forth therein.
52. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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death claim arising from the crash of a helicopter in Peru. The decedent was
not a resident of Texas, the forum state. The Colombian corporate defen-
dant which operated the helicopter in Peru had purchased helicopters and
supplies from Texas businesses, and its employees had been trained to use
and maintain the helicopters in Texas. Because the claim against the non-
resident did not arise from its contacts with Texas, an exercise of general
rather than specific jurisdiction was necessary. The Court concluded that
Texas' assertion of general jurisdiction violated due process.
In 1985, the Court again addressed the issue of judicial jurisdiction in
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. 53 The case involved a franchise dispute
between Burger King and a franchisee operating in Michigan. The fran-
chise contract contained a choice of law clause, and the negotiations
concerning its execution and eventual breach were conducted either di-
rectly with Burger King headquarters in Florida or through Michigan
district employees directly controlled by the corporate headquarters. Under
those circumstances, the Court held that it did not violate due process for
Florida to exercise jurisdiction over the Michigan resident franchise hold-
ers as to claims arising from the franchise agreement.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority of the Court, set forth a two-
pronged analysis which seemed similar to that in World-Wide Volks-
wagen,54 but was in reality quite different. Burger King held that the burden
was on the plaintiff to show that the defendant purposefully availed himself
of the benefits and protections of the forum. (This emphasizes only the
contacts of the defendant and seems to echo both World-Wide Volkswagen
and Hanson.) If this connection was shown, the burden then shifted to the
defendant to show that the exercise of jurisdiction was fundamentally
unfair. Fairness could be evaluated not just in light of the defendant's
contacts, but also in light of other contacts and interests, including those of
the plaintiff and the forum. The effect of the shift in the burden of
persuasion was to create a presumption of jurisdiction. Significant in the
Burger King two-pronged analysis is the absence of any attention to the
sovereign interests of the forum or of other jurisdictions. The emphasis is
markedly different from that in World-Wide Volkswagen and is consistent
with the abandonment of sovereignty as a dimension of judicial jurisdic-
tion.
BurgerKing is significant for two major reasons. First, in terms of result,
it is a major treatment by the Court that upholds a specific state exercise of
judicial jurisdiction rather than striking it down; that fact alone sends the
message that states sometimes correctly measure statutory exercises of
53. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
54. See supra note 35.
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judicial jurisdiction against constitutional standards. Secondly, the meth-
odology (as detailed earlier) seems to relax the rigors of Hanson as refined
in World-Wide. While Burger King adheres to the notion that minimum
contacts are to be found by looking solely at the actions of the defendant,
deference to sovereignty is missing in that determination. Second, the case
is significant because it presumes the existence of jurisdiction from a
showing of purposeful availment, with the burden on the defendant to
refute that presumption based upon factors other than the contacts of the
defendant. The second prong of the analysis is what led Justice Stevens to
observe in Asahi that personal jurisdiction can sometimes be determined
without reference to minimum contacts. 55 What he meant was that the
second prong of fundamental fairness was so clearly lacking (the Asahi
Court was unanimous on that point) that there was no reason to agonize
over whether the first prong was met. 56
The most recent legislative jurisdiction case, Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 57 also has a judicial jurisdiction dimension to it. Phillips Petroleum
was a class action for royalty payments brought by the lessors of land. The
class members resided in Kansas, the forum state, and in other states.
Regarding judicial jurisdiction, the Court held that a plaintiff class action in
Kansas could constitutionally bind members of the represented class who
resided in states other than Kansas and whose leases with Phillips con-
cerned land located in other states. On the issue of legislative jurisdiction,
however, the Court held that Kansas law could not be applied to govern the
merits of the claims of class members not residing in Kansas. While there
was some ambiguity in the opinion as to whether Kansas law in fact differed
from the laws of the states principally involved (Texas and Oklahoma), the
Court did hold that should such a difference exist, the law of those states
would have to be applied to resident class members. As a combination case
on the issues of judicial and legislative jurisdiction, the decision in Shutts
reaches a most interesting result: it treats the state's adjudicatory authority
expansively but restricts its ability to apply its law to the merits of the
controversy.
55. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1038 (1987).
56. What is most interesting about the Burger King analysis is that it would be possible to reverse
the two prongs. In the current situation, the plaintiff first shows purposeful availment, and the defendant
then has the burden to demonstrate unfairness. If instead the burden were initially placed on the
defendant to show that, based upon contacts other than the defendant's, the forum was a fundamentally
unfair place for the litigation, the analysis would progress far toward finally escaping the purposeful
availment restrictions. Purposeful availment would become the second prong of the inquiry, and the
rigid, defendant-oriented analysis of Hanson v. Denckla would be ripe for demise.
57. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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Most recently, the Court addressed the question of judicial jurisdiction
in Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior Court.58 The case arose in California,
originally as a products liability action brought by a person injured in a
motorcycle accident in California against Cheng Shin, a tire manufacturer.
Although the Court's opinion is not factually clear, it appears that Cheng
Shin sought indemnification from Asahi, the manufacturer of the valve
assembly in the allegedly defective tire, by filing the California equivalent
of a third party complaint-a "cross-complaint." The Court's opinion
implies that Asahi was not a party until joined by Cheng Shin; that
conclusion is confirmed by petitioner Asahi's brief before the Court. The
plaintiff's personal injury claim was settled, leaving only Cheng Shin's
indemnification claim remaining for adjudication. Cheng Shin was a Tai-
wanese corporation, and Asahi was a Japanese corporation. The sale from
Asahi to Cheng Shin took place in Taiwan. The valve assemblies were then
shipped from Japan to Taiwan for inclusion in the tire.
In a very confusing voting pattern, the Court held that California lacked
jurisdiction. Applying the dual requirement of Burger King,59 four mem-
bers of the Court concluded that Asahi had not purposefully availed itself of
the benefits and protections of California law by the sole act of placing its
products into the stream of commerce knowing that eventual distribution in
California, among other places, would result.60 Five members of the Court
felt that placing the product into the stream of commerce with foreseeable
distribution in California was sufficient to satisfy the "purposefully avail-
ing" requirement. 6'
Despite that disagreement, the Court was virtually unanimous in con-
cluding that an exercise of jurisdiction in California was fundamentally
unfair.62 In so doing, the Court demonstrated a consensus which is rare in
this line of cases and is perhaps indicative that a new pattern (of results, if
not of rationale) has emerged. Justice O'Connor seemed to adhere to the
58. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct 1026 (1987).
59. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
60. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (opinionof Justice OConnor-joinedby Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Powell).
61. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and in the judgment; joined by Justice White, Justice
Marshall, and Justice Blackmun.) Although he did not vote with the concurring opinion of Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun (which would indicate purposeful availment by any man-
ufacturer placing a product into the stream of commerce), Justice Stevens did appear to concur that the
facts of Asahi indicated that Asahi had purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of
California law. His position would require a factual determination in each case rather than making the
more abstract determination simply based upon placement into the stream of commerce. Justice Stevens
seemed to indicate that mere placement alone would not be sufficient to constitute purposeful
availment.




philosophy that legislative jurisdiction would require even more contacts.
She noted that it was likely that California law could not govern the merits
of an indemnification claim arising from a Taiwanese contract being
litigated between foreign corporations. 63 Of most concern for the future is
the very close split in the Court as to whether placement of an item into the
stream of commerce will suffice to meet the "purposeful availment" test.
Should that issue ultimately be resolved in the negative, the results, given
the practical realities of modern commerce, will be both far-reaching and
incredibly unfortunate.
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS OF A PATTERN
Attached as an appendix to this article is a chart of the above cases which
I prepared for reference during the discussion. The chart is organized
chronologically, with the legislative jurisdiction cases interspersed with
the judicial jurisdiction cases. In each instance, an appropriate holding is
checked to indicate whether jurisdiction was upheld or denied.
Viewing the group of cases with the perspective of almost ten years since
Shaffer v. Heitner, it is possible to make some general observations.
Interestingly, the group does not fulfill the hopes raised by International
Shoe Co. v. Washington for a broader scope of judicial jurisdiction. The
daring philosophical departure in International Shoe might have freed the
states to expand their judicial jurisdiction without the fictional constraints
which attended judicial jurisdictional developments in the first half of the
century. Instead, it had the opposite effect. While the states made use of the
freedom to adopt new and broader long-arm statutes, the adjudicated cases
were more likely to restrict state judicial jurisdiction than to expand it. The
chart shows that every judicial jurisdiction case from Hanson v. Denckla
through Rush v. Savchuk denied judicial jurisdiction. Justice Black's insis-
tence in International Shoe that the vague notion of fundamental fairness
used there to uphold state jurisdiction might just as easily have the reverse
effect now seems very prescient.
In truth, the overall pattern of the majority ofjudicial jurisdiction cases is
extremely restrictive. In Hanson, Shaffer, Kulko v. Superior Court, Rush,
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia S.A. v. Hall, and Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior Court, the
Court interpreted the due process clause in a manner that denied judicial
jurisdiction over facts where individual states had chosen to assert such
jurisdiction. The impact of the decisions in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine and
Calder v. Jones on the pattern is minimal, for they simply hold that the first
63. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. 1026.
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amendment exerts no additional constitutional control over judicial juris-
diction. Without the first amendment concerns, the contacts of the non-
resident defendants with the forum would have been more than sufficient to
satisfy the standards of due process. Thus the only case to interpret due
process in favor of a state assertion of jurisdiction was Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz.
In contrast to the very restrictive results in the judicial jurisdiction cases,
the results in the legislative jurisdiction cases have a reverse pattern. Nevada
v. Hall, Thomas v. Washington GasLight Co., andAllstate Insurance Co. v.
Hague support expanded notions of a state's ability to apply its own law to the
merits. In each instance, the Court upheld an expansive view of state author-
ity, even to the point of impairing a sister state judgment in Washington Gas
Light. The chart demonstrates that legislative jurisdiction was upheld in
every case that came before the Court prior to Insurance Corp. ofIreland v.
Compagnie desBauxites de Guinee. Thus, in those cases, the Court tolerated
very broad assertions of state court authority to control the outcome of the
litigation on the merits while simultaneously restricting the ability of the
states to serve as a forum. Prior to 1985, one could almost predict that any
state that could satisfy the Court's due process requirements, and thus had
the ability to serve as a forum, would also be able to apply its law to the merits.
This would mean that judicial jurisdiction had emerged as at least the domi-
nant control, and perhaps the sole control. The implications for the new
interest analysis, pro-forum law choice of law systems are obvious-the
pattern of decision virtually left the field open to them.
A key shift in the pattern of decision comes in Insurance Corp. of
Ireland. The footnote in Insurance Corp. of Ireland64 reevaluated the long-
accepted notion that due process judicial jurisdiction controls involved
both sovereignty and fairness to defendants. The footnote's departure from
established notions was indeed significant, even if virtually extraneous to
the opinion. Once judicial jurisdiction was viewed by the Court solely as a
matter of fairness to nonresident defendants, it was much easier to tolerate
an expansive state assertion of jurisdiction. That the Court must take more
care in maintaining the integrity of the federal system than in protecting any
particular individual seems plain enough. Although the sovereignty aspect
of judicial jurisdiction disappeared, the problem it addressed-the manner
in which the states respect and defer to each other in unadjudicated
settings-did not disappear. The solution is to address the problem in what
was always its most appropriate setting. That setting is the constitutional
control of legislative jurisdiction.
64. 456 U.S. 694, 702 n.10; see supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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The evolution of the concepts of judicial jurisdiction and legislative
jurisdiction prior to Insurance Corp. of Ireland had finally reached a
position which could not be supported. In the post-International Shoe era,
absolute freedom for a forum to choose its own law was insupportable;
expansion in the choices of forum available to a litigant could not be
tolerated if any change in forum meant a change in the applicable law.
Matters had to be rectified.
Nineteen eighty-five was a watershed in the pattern. In Phillips Pe-
troleum, the Court affirmed judicial jurisdiction, but refused to allow
Kansas to apply its law to govern the substance of the claims related to the
non-Kansas lessors. While it is possible to minimize the importance of the
case by viewing its limit on state legislative jurisdiction as unique to that
particular class action context, it is also possible to conclude that the Court
has reassessed its position on legislative jurisdiction and has returned some
constitutional controls to the area.
Similarly, in Burger King, the Court upheld a state assertion of judicial
jurisdiction for the first time in thirty years. The case postdated the
abandonment of the sovereignty dimension in Insurance Corp. of Ireland,
and coincided with the apparent reemergence of some constitutional limit
on legislative jurisdiction in Phillips Petroleum. The majority opinion
explicitly confirmed the idea present in Insurance Corp. of Ireland that due
process control of judicial jurisdiction protects fairness, and not sov-
ereignty.
While the other cases decided since Insurance Corp. of Ireland do not
show as clear a pattern as I would like, they are not inconsistent with the
proposition that the Court has reassessed its thinking. The importance of
Helicopteros is questionable, because it was an attempt to exercise general
jurisdiction rather than specific jurisdiction. I do not believe that Asahi is a
retrenchment, but rather, due to its unique facts, an abnormal judicial
jurisdiction case which lent itself to only one outcome. The products
liability claim by the injured party against a nonresident manufacturer had
been settled. All that remained was an indemnification claim arising from a
foreign contract brought by one nonresident against another. Had Asahi
simply owed money to Cheng Shin, there would have been no doubt that
California could not serve as a forum for such a contract dispute. It seems of
no significance, once the tort claim was settled, that the asserted con-
tractual liability had been activated by Cheng Shin having been sued in
California. Any potential justification for jurisdiction had simply disap-
peared.
While Justice O'Connor's opinion in Asahi appears to "bow" to the
sovereignty of nations in reaching a jurisdictional conclusion, this does not
contradict the abandonment of sovereignty in Insurance Corp. of Ireland.
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Just prior to her discussion of sovereignty, Justice O'Connor expressed
doubt that California law could govern the merits of a claim between two
non-resident manufacturers arising from an international contract.65 It is
possible that the discussion of sovereignty can be read in conjunction with
the choice-of-law dicta and that the result arises solely from fundamental
fairness. Alternately, one might suppose that sovereignty would be more
relevant to judicial jurisdiction over citizens of foreign countries than of
sister states. For myself, I think the Asahi sovereignty language unneces-
sary to the result, and probably related to legislative jurisdiction at best.
On the whole, I believe the recent trend is to separate the two concepts of
judicial and legislative jurisdiction. Both Burger King and Phillips Pe-
troleum treat the two conceptually related areas as equal considerations,
and apply separate but related analyses to each. I hope that the new
analytical framework which some scholars call for and some members of
the Court think is emerging will be one that expands permissible state
jurisdiction, but carefully avoids automatic application of forum law to
govern the merits of the litigation. With this in mind as my general
conclusion, I would like to examine how the various members of the Court
have contributed to the Court's current position; to do so, I will examine the
voting records and written opinions of each member of the Court in the
cases that are considered here.
JUSTICE SCALIA
Justice Scalia, the newest member of the Court, has only participated in
its most recent judicial jurisdiction decision, Asahi. He wrote no opinion in
that case, but joined Justice O'Connor's opinion that the valve manufac-
turer did not purposefully avail itself of the benefits and protections of
California law by the act of placing valve assemblies into the stream of
commerce with the knowledge that some might ultimately come into use in
California. In that conclusion, he appears to have been in the minority.
Justice Scalia did not cast any vote with the otherwise unanimous Court
on the issue of whether California was a fundamentally unfair forum for the
indemnification litigation. Given his vote on the purposeful availment issue
and the otherwise solid position of the Court on the fairness issue, I cannot
guess why he would not have voted on this issue.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR
Of the current members of the Court, Justice O'Connor's position is the
easiest to characterize. She has contributed to the developments under
65. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1034 (1987).
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discussion here only since Insurance Corp. of Ireland in 1982. At the same
time, her position is made more difficult to deduce because, apart from the
decision in Asahi, it must be judged solely from her voting pattern. She
wrote no jurisdictional opinions-majority, concurring, or dissenting-
prior to the decision in Asahi.
Over the span of cases, it is noteworthy that Justice O'Connor has voted
with the majority every time. She voted with the majority in Keeton and
Calder for the proposition that there is no additional judicial jurisdictional
restriction to be found in the first amendment. She voted with the majority
in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, which seemed to lay to rest the sovereignty
aspect of due process in a footnote. She voted with the majority in
Helicopteros to strike down an attempt by Texas to exercise general
jurisdiction in a very attenuated fact pattern. She joined the majority in
upholding Florida's exercise of judicial jurisdiction in Burger King. She
also joined the majority position concerning judicial jurisdiction over the
class action and forbidding Kansas to apply its own law to some class
members in Phillips Petroleum. Finally, she must be taken to have voted
with the majority in Asahi, despite the fact she was in the minority on the
purposeful availment issue.66 For those interested in comparing Justice
O'Connor's voting pattern to that of Chief Justice Rehnquist, he was the
author of the majority opinions which she joined in Keeton, Calder, and
Phillips Petroleum. Her votes are also identical to his in the other three
cases in which she participated. In addition, she was chosen by the Chief
Justice to write the opinion of the court in Asahi, despite the fact that both
she and the Chief Justice were really in the minority on one issue in the
case. 67 Thus, in the area of judicial and legislative jurisdiction, Justice
O'Connor has yet to reach a conclusion different from those reached by
Chief Justice Rehnquist.
If I am correct that the decision in Insurance Corp. of Ireland marked a
watershed for the Court in the areas of judicial and legislative jurisdiction,
then Justice O'Connor's first appearance on the Court in that case might be
significant. However, it is doubtful that such a junior member of the Court
played a significant role in developing the current position, especially in
light of the fact that she has authored only the most recent of these opinions.
I think it much more likely that the significance of her votes is the support
they lend to her law school classmate, Chief Justice Rehnquist. Chief
Justice Rehnquist is the member of the Court who is the most interested in
these questions, and who appears, by the force of his mastery of the area, to
be emerging as the Court's leader on these topics.
66. Justice O'Connor was chosen by the Chief Justice to write what is labelled the opinion of the
Court. This can only indicate that she was considered to have voted with the majority.
67. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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JUSTICE STEWART
Another member of the Court whose views must be deduced solely from
his voting pattern is Justice Stewart. His participation in the line of
jurisdiction cases ended with Washington Gas Light. His departure pre-
dated Insurance Corp. of Ireland; although he was still a member of the
Court when Allstate Insurance was decided, he did not participate in the
decision. He voted with the majority in Shaffer, Kulko, Hall, Rush, and
World-Wide Volkswagen. He voted with the plurality in Washington Gas
Light. His voting record would thus seem to fit the pattern observed prior to
Insurance Corp. ofIreland: a tendency to restrain state-exercises of judicial
jurisdiction (Shaffer, Kulko, Hall, Rush, and World-Wide Volkswagen)
while tolerating expansive notions of state legislative jurisdiction (Hall and
Washington Gas Light).
The end of his tenure on the Court coincides with the final appearance of
the sovereignty aspect of due process as a control over judicial jurisdiction;
his voting pattern would be consistent with such a view. It therefore may be
significant that the Court's abandonment of that sovereignty dimension was
contemporaneous with Justice Stewart's departure. Indeed, Justice O'Con-
nor's votes are possible because of Justice Stewart's departure. Had he
remained a member of the Court, a new majority position might have been
difficult to forge. I believe, in all candor, however, that the current pattern
was destined to evolve with or without Justice Stewart. Even without
Justice O'Connor, the demise of sovereignty as an element of judicial
jurisdiction has been supported by a substantial majority of the Court.
Asahi indicates that every member of the Court would now utilize the two-
pronged approach developed in Burger King.
JUSTICE POWELL
Justice Powell is the final member of the Court who did not participate in
all of the decisions beginning with Shaffer. He did not participate (one
would assume due to health problems) in Burger King and Phillips Pe-
troleum, although he was a member of the Court at those times. He did
participate inAsahi, and joined Justice O'Connor's opinion. Unlike the two
previously discussed justices, however, Justice Povwell was the author of
three opinions in this line of cases: a concurring opinion in Shaffer, a
dissenting opinion in Allstate, and a concurring opinion in Insurance Corp.
of Ireland. His pattern of participation in the cases is consistent with the
thesis of this article that judicial and legislative jurisdiction have re-
emerged as separate and significant constitutional controls following the
demise of the sovereignty concept as an element of judicial jurisdiction in
Insurance Corp. of Ireland.
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Initially, a good bit can be deduced simply from Justice Powell's voting
pattern. He concurred with the majority in Shaffer and voted with the
majority in Shaffer, Kulko, Hall, Rush, World-Wide Volkswagen, Helicop-
teros and Asahi. That pattern indicates that Justice Powell has a commit-
ment to the idea that there are constitutional limitations on the exercise of
judicial jurisdiction. His vote in Helicopteros is of limited significance,
since the case was one of general rather than specific jurisdiction. The
dimensions of the limits on specific jurisdiction seem more important,
since that has clearly become the preferred mode of asserting judicial
jurisdiction in the vast majority of states. In addition, one can deduce from
Justice Powell's votes with the majority in Keeton and Calder that he views
that constitutional limitation as having its source in the due process clause
alone.
Nevertheless, Justice Powell had a much less restrictive view of specific
jurisdiction than the majority of the Court, at least during the early and
middle sections of this group of cases. This conclusion is supported by
Justice Powell's positions in Kulko and Shaffer. He voted with the dissent to
uphold the assertion of jurisdiction in Kulko. In the watershed decision in
Shaffer, he was the author of a concurring opinion. In that opinion he
accepted the majority's position that the due process notions of Interna-
tional Shoe applied to all forms of jurisdiction, not just to in personam
jurisdiction. 68 Like the majority, he concluded that "their positions as
directors and officers of a Delaware corporation can [not] provide sufficient
contacts to support the Delaware courts' assertion of jurisdiction in this
case. "69 However, he indicated a willingness to be somewhat more flexible
than the majority, suggesting that judgment should be reserved on the
question of whether an exercise of jurisdiction through real property
(limited to the value thereof) might not be desirable and without significant
cost to the due process notions of International Shoe.70 I take his observa-
tion to mean that he concurred generally in the philosophical basis of the
case and with the result on the facts in the case, but that he was concerned
that it might provide too broad a restriction on state judicial jurisdiction.
This conclusion is consistent with the somewhat more tolerant view of
judicial jurisdiction demonstrated by his dissenting vote in Kulko.
By Asahi at the end of the line of cases, Justice Powell evinced a
somewhat more restrictive attitude. He voted with the minority of the Court
that placement of an item into the stream of commerce did not constitute
purposeful availment. Rather than making too much of that vote, I wish to
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reserve judgment until I see him vote in a case without the factual oddities
of Asahi. In terms of the bottom line at least, Justice Powell was a member
of a virtually unanimous Court in Asahi. I conclude from his voting pattern
that he must have some framework for restricting judicial jurisdiction in
mind, but one that differs, or perhaps has differed, in application from that
of other members of the Court.
Despite a somewhat broader tolerance for assertions of judicial jurisdic-
tion, Justice Powell usually differed with the ultimate position of the Court
during the evolution of legislative jurisdictional controls. Although he
concurred in Washington Gas Light, his vote does not demonstrate a
relaxed attitude on the subject. That opinion relied upon the distinction
between Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt7' and Industrial Commission of
Wisconsin v. McCartin72 rather than overruling Magnolia Petroleum and
conferring additional power on the states as the plurality chose to do. That
same dissatisfaction with relaxing controls upon state exercises of legis-
lative jurisdiction is also demonstrated by Justice Powell's dissenting
opinion in Allstate Insurance. The opinion shows quite clearly that he is not
at all amenable to the idea that judicial jurisdiction alone is the control, and
that a constitutionally permissible judicial forum can therefore always
choose to apply its own law. While accepting the majority's general
willingness to invalidate a state's choice of law only in the absence of
significant contacts, 73 Justice Powell disagreed about whether Minnesota
had such significant contacts. In his analysis, he touched upon two dimen-
sions of the constitutional control of the choice of law process: the first
relating to basic fairness to the parties74 and the second bearing on the
relative sovereign rights of the jurisdictions involved. 75 He explicitly stated
that any choice of law must be assessed "in light of these two important
constitutional policies," ' 76 and accused the plurality of failing to "dis-
tinguish questions of choice of law from those of [judicial] jurisdiction. ,77
Justice Powell found that while application of Minnesota law would frus-
trate "no reasonable expectations of the parties,"' 78 it did not seem to
71. 320 U.S. 430 (1943); see supra note 37.
72. 330 U.S. 622 (1947). It appeared to be the case that the "unmistakable language" distinction of
Magnolia Petroleum in McCartin left the area, as a practical matter, with such awards having virtually
no finality. See supra note 37.
73. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 332 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 333.
75. Id. at 334.
76. Id. at 335-36.
77. Id. at 336, n.3.
78. Id. at 336.
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further a legitimate state interest. 79 From that, Justice Powell concluded
that it was an impermissible intrusion upon the sovereignty of Wisconsin
for Minnesota to apply its law to determine the merits of the controversy.
On the whole, I conclude that Justice Powell never let himself get lost in the
Court's tendency to restrict judicial jurisdiction and tolerate virtually any
choice of law by a forum with sufficient contacts to satisfyjudicial jurisdic-
tion. He is consistent in maintaining an analytical line between the two.
In his concurring opinion in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Justice Powell
illuminated what might otherwise have gone unobserved about the majority
decision. In examining his opinion, it must be recalled that the majority's
treatment of personal jurisdiction was a totally gratuitous aside. It was
Justice Powell who explicitly observed that the Court had, for the first time,
chosen to limit personal jurisdiction only by the fair play aspects of due
process, thus abandoning the sovereignty elements of due process which
had prevailed as recently as World-Wide Volkswagen.80 He felt this develop-
ment "could require a sweeping but largely unexplicated revision of
jurisdictional doctrine."' 81 This was an approach which he believed
"effect[ed] a potentially substantial change of law." 82 1 do not detect in his
observations any implication that such a result is necessarily wrong; rather,
he points out that something of significance had just taken place in absolute
dicta on a very unlikely set of facts. Having previously demonstrated a
more tolerant attitude by opinion and vote in other judicial jurisdictional
cases, it follows that he should not be displeased with a relaxation of the
standard.
Justice Powell's failure to express explicit disapproval of the demise of
sovereignty might be considered inconsistent with his opinion in Allstate
Insurance. Recall that in Allstate Insurance, Justice Powell observed that
choice of law analysis still applied dual elements of fair play and sov-
ereignty. I do not read Insurance Corp. of Ireland and Allstate Insurance as
inconsistent. Instead, I would read them as saying that sovereignty had
been placed in its rightful position-one consideration bearing on choice of
law, but of no moment in regard to judicial jurisdiction. Justice Powell
joined the opinion in Asahi in which Justice O'Connor observed that
California law probably could not constitutionally apply to the merits of the
indemnification claim between the nonresident manufacturers. I believe
that his votes and his opinions are consistent with just such a result.
79. Id. at 337.
80. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 710 (1982)
(Powell, J., concurring).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 714.
652
Vol 62:631, 1987
Supreme Court Jurisdictional Voting Patterns
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER
All of the remaining members of the Court have participated in each of
the decisions from Shaffer to Phillips Petroleum. Of this group, Chief
Justice Burger's position is probably the most difficult to analyze, due to
one surprising fact: he did not write a single opinion of any sort in the entire
line of cases. One must deduce his position entirely from his voting pattern.
Regarding judicial jurisdiction, Chief Justice Burger is a rather dramatic
example of the person at the exact center of the Court. In every judicial
jurisdiction case, the Chief Justice voted with the majority. I suppose that
one could deduce from this fact either that he was truly at the center of the
Court, or that he was showing what gossips have long attributed to him: a
proclivity for voting with the majority in order to assign the writing of the
opinion of the Court. In any event, he voted to restrict exercises of specific
jurisdiction in Shaffer, Kulko, Rush, and World-Wide Volkswagen; he voted
to restrict the exercise of general jurisdiction inHelicopteros, but he agreed
in Keeton and Calder that the first amendment contributed no additional
judicial jurisdictional restraint. Additionally, he voted with the majority in
Insurance Corp. of Ireland. This vote could simply indicate support for the
use of jurisdiction as a discovery sanction, or it could indicate complete
agreement with the footnote in the case laying sovereignty to rest as a factor
limiting judicial jurisdiction. His agreement with the majority opinion in
Insurance Corp. of Ireland probably encompassed the broader principle.
This conclusion is supported by his vote with the majority in Burger King.
The Chief Justice never joined the relaxed attitude the Court began to
display toward legislative jurisdiction; his voting pattern makes that abso-
lutely clear. He joined both dissenting opinions in Hall, thus demonstrating
a greater willingness than the majority to use the Constitution to restrain
excessive state exercises of sovereignty. He voted with the concurrence in
Washington Gas Light, aligning himself with Justice White in favor of
maintaining the sovereignty limitations of Magnolia Petroleum. Finally,
Chief Justice Burger voted with the dissent in Allstate Insurance. The
dissent there objected to the excessive exercise of legislative jurisdiction by
Minnesota on the grounds that it intruded unduly into the concerns of
Wisconsin without furthering any legitimate interest of the forum. It is
hardly surprising, then, that Chief Justice Burger voted with the majority in
Phillips Petroleum, which he must have regarded as a step in the right
direction of using the Constitution to limit state choice of law. His voting
pattern shows that he would have been pleased by the reemergence of the
Constitution as a control on choice of law after the debacle of Allstate
Insurance.
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Because the Chief Justice did not write a single opinion in this line of
cases, I think he cannot be identified as the architect of the new consensus
on the Court. While his votes have contributed to that development, I
suspect that the new consensus originated with some other member of the
Court.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN
It is very difficult to discern any pattern that indicates a philosophy
governing judicial and legislative jurisdiction from either the opinions
written by Justice Blackmun or from his votes. Perhaps more than any other
justice participating in all of the relevant cases, Justice Blackmun's position
seems inconsistent and obscure.
Justice Blackmun appears at first not as tolerant of the trend toward
relaxing control over legislative jurisdiction. He was the author of a strong
dissent in Hall, a case which he predicted would "place severe strain on our
system of cooperative federalism." 83 Justice Blackmun accused the major-
ity of countenancing a reduction in the sovereign rights of Nevada, assert-
ing that a state was now to be treated (in the courts of sister states) merely
"as any other litigant." 84 He thought this result was inconsistent with the
philosophy of the Constitution. He reasoned that if the eleventh amendment
prevented a state from being sued in federal court, the draftsmen of the
Constitution could not have intended a state to be subject to suit as an
ordinary litigant in the courts of its sister states. 85
Despite that clear defense of state sovereignty, Justice Blackmun then
proceeded to vote with the plurality in both Allstate Insurance and Wash-
ington Gas Light, a voting pattern which could hardly be regarded as
defensive of state sovereignty. Indeed, the net effect of those two cases is
quite to the contrary. The intrusion into a sister state judgment in Washing-
ton Gas Light seems more offensive than the loss of sovereign immunity to
which he objected so strenuously in Hall. Returning, perhaps, to his
position of honoring state sovereignty, Justice Blackmun voted with the
majority in Phillips Petroleum, thus taking the side of restraining the ability
of Kansas to apply its own law to claims related to nonresident royalty
holders. On the whole, this pattern seems inconsistent and without any
predictable basis or philosophy.
Neither is there any particularly enlightening conclusion to be drawn
from Justice Blackmun's opinions and votes in the area of judicial jurisdic-
tion. For the most part, he inhabited the mainstream. He voted with the
83. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 429 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 427.
85. Id. at 431.
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majority in Shaffer, Kulko, and Rush, the net effect of which was to restrict
state exercise of judicial jurisdiction. He took the position that constitu-
tional controls over jurisdiction in defamation cases came only from due
process, a position evidenced by his votes with the majorities in Keeton and
Calder. He voted with the majority in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, and
wrote the majority opinion in Helicopteros. In reviewing his opinion in
Helicopteros, I found nothing of any particular note. Justice Blackmun
simply espoused established ideas, finding the factual contacts with the
forum insufficient. If there is any deviation between Justice Blackmun and
the pattern of the majority of the Court, it is that Justice Blackmun has not
been as restrictive as other members of the Court in regard to judicial
jurisdiction. Such a conclusion is consistent with his rejection of the
plurality's finding against purposeful availment in Asahi.
Justice Blackmun's dissent in World-Wide Volkswagen is his sole devia-
tion from the majority in the judicial jurisdiction cases. His opinion there
placed special emphasis on the fact that the claim arose in connection with
an automobile. Focusing on the fact that "we are a nation on wheels,"
Justice Blackmun thought it was reasonable to allow Oklahoma to assert
personal jurisdiction even over the wholesaler and retailer of the vehicle. 86
It would be difficult to categorize his dissent as having established any
particular judicial philosophy, since his focus was on the nature of the
object involved. He voted with the majority inBurgerKing, adhering to the
idea that the limitations on judicial jurisdiction stem from fairness rather
than sovereignty. His vote to uphold jurisdiction in Burger King is consis-
tent with his prior dissent in World-Wide Volkswagen, although Burger
King lacked the presence of a tort claim related to an automobile. Finally,
Justice Blackmun voted with the majority inAsahi, believing that a product
manufacturer purposefully availed itself by placing an item into the stream
of commerce, but also adhering to the almost unanimous opinion of the
Court that California was a fundamentally unfair forum for the litigation of
the indemnification claim. His vote on the stream of commerce portion
seems consistent with his dissent in World-Wide Volkswagen; indeed,
Asahi seems an easier case on its facts for that idea than did the facts against
the retailer and wholesaler of the automobile in World-Wide Volkswagen.
While his voting pattern is consistent enough, Justice Blackmun's opin-
ions do not articulate any clear personal philosophy of the dimensions of
the controls in the area. His opinion in Helicopteros seems to me quite
ordinary. While one might agree with the result he espoused in World-Wide
Volkswagen, his reliance on the fact that the sole claim involved an




automobile does not add very much to jurisdictional jurisprudence. His
votes on the purposeful availment and fundamental fairness issues in Asahi
seem easier to justify than the position articulated in World-Wide Volks-
wagen.
As to the relationship of judicial and legislative jurisdiction, I cannot
detect in Justice Blackmun's opinions and votes any particular pattern. It is
not just that the opinions lack an overall coordinating philosophy; I cannot
even discern an ebb and flow in the voting pattern that indicates a change of
position over time. More than any other member of the Court, Justice
Blackmun's position seems enigmatic. Rather than assuming that Justice
Blackmun just doesn't know what he is doing, as some might be tempted to
do, I would rather conclude that the evidence is insufficient to allow me to
understand his position, or that I simply have not been able to deduce what
that position is, although others might be able to see it. In the preparation of
this article, I found work on his record to be the most difficult encountered.
JUSTICE WHITE
In rather sharp contrast to Justice Blackmun, Justice White's votes and
opinions reveal a discernible pattern. His judicial jurisdiction opinions in
particular serve to illuminate the most recent developments on the Court.
Justice White's record on legislative jurisdiction places him in the
mainstream of the Court on pure choice of law issues. He voted with the
majority in Hall to allow California to override Nevada's sovereign immu-
nity defense. He also voted to allow Minnesota to apply its own stacking
rule in Allstate Insurance. Like the rest of the Court, he found a limit in the
Constitution that was violated by Kansas' attempt to apply its law to the
claims of nonresident royalty owners in Phillips Petroleum. Unlike many
other members of the Court, he distinguished between those choice of law
decisions and the decision in Washington Gas Light, which presented a
question of deference due to state judgments. His concurring opinion in
Washington Gas Light relied upon McCartin (despite its "questionable
foundations" 87) on the ground that it had been in place for 30 years. He was
reluctant to allow a workers' compensation administrative award to be
given less preclusive ability outside the rendering state than a court award
would have been given. In his view, there was reason to suspect that the
logic of relying upon the law of the enforcing state to determine preclusive
effects could reach "many everyday tort actions." 88 Regarding such pre-
clusive effect, he believed that "Mr. Chief Justice Stone's opinion in
87. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 289 (1980) (White, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 287.
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Magnolia state[d] the sounder doctrine." 89 Thus, Justice White agreed
with the plurality opinion as to the result (that the Virginia award did not
preclude a supplemental award in the District of Columbia), but he did so
on grounds more deferential to the sovereignty of Virginia than the plurality
opinion, which took the position that in every case a second state was free
to give a supplemental workers' compensation award.
From the opinion in Washington Gas Light and from his other votes, I
would characterize Justice White as middle of the road on legislative
jurisdiction. He has been willing to allow states more leeway in making
choices than might have traditionally been expected, but subject to some
limitations in the unadjudicated setting and subject to more constitutional
restraint once there has been an adjudication in a sister state.
On the subject of judicial jurisdiction, Justice White's behavior does not,
on the surface, seem entirely consistent. His votes in cases where he did not
write opinions in some instances demonstrate disagreement with the main-
stream of the Court. His votes sometimes diverge in favor of expanding
judicial jurisdiction beyond that allowed by the Court, and sometimes deny
jurisdiction where the Court upholds it. Justice White wrote what may
prove to be the two most important decisions in the area during this era and
the contrast in those two opinions may reveal a crucial shift on the Court.
First, one must conclude that Justice White clearly indicated by voting
with the majority inKeeton and Calderthathe finds no judicial jurisdictional
limitations in defamation cases from any source other than due process. He
voted with the majority of the Court to effectively restrict the judicial juris-
diction available in the fact patterns of Shaffer, Rush, and Helicopteros.
Despite that fact, he voted with the dissent against the restriction of state
court jurisdiction which resulted in Kulko, indicating that he perhaps has a
broader concept of judicial jurisdiction than other members of the Court.
Justice White favored a restrictive approach in Shaffer, Rush, World-Wide
Volkswagen, andBurgerKing, but took a broader approach inKulko and on
the purposeful availment issues inAsahi. The apparent dichotomy might be
explained on the grounds that Shaffer and Rush were more concerned with
the philosophy ofjurisdiction than with the application of a setjurisdictional
theory to a given group of facts. Asahi also seems to me to be more of a
pragmatic case than a major philosophical case. Indeed, I see no philosophi-
cal change betweenBurgerKing andAsahi, and suspect the differing results
come from application of facts rather than a philosophical shift. Justice
White wrote the majority opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen, and then voted
with the dissentinBurgerKing, indicating an unwillingness to agree with the
89. Id. at 289.
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broad assertion of jurisdiction the Court upheld there. He voted in favor of
finding purposeful availment in Asahi. The dissent in Burger King seems
particularly important since the Court in Burger King used language very
similar to that employed by Justice White in World-Wide Volkswagen. De-
spite that similarity, however, the two opinions function in materially dif-
ferent ways, a fact which is indicated by Justice White's dissent in the later
case. While Asahi uses the Burger King methodology, the lack of disagree-
ment on the Court on the fundamental fairness issue indicates that the facts
were so clear cut as to not illuminate the practical differences between World-
Wide Volkswagen and Burger King.
Justice White's pattern is difficult to characterize, other than to state that
it is "eclectic." I suspect that it simply reveals a different philosophical
basis for approaching the problem. If so, it is possible that his different
philosophy reaches a different conclusion than that of other members of the
Court, with the result varying with the impact of his framework upon any
given fact pattern. Justice White's vote in favor of finding purposeful
availment in Asahi is consistent with a broader attitude towards legislative
jurisdiction than that of some Court members, but his vote on the funda-
mental fairness issue there is exactly the same as that of every other member
of the Court participating. I would not take his vote in favor of purposeful
availment in Asahi as inconsistent with his opinion in World-Wide Volks-
wagen due to the difference between the manufacturer as the relevant party
in the former and the retailer and wholesaler in the latter.
Probably the best initial insight into Justice White's judicial jurisdiction
philosophy appears in his opinion for the majority in World-Wide Volks-
wagen. It seems to me that his opinion sets the high-water mark (some
might say it was the last gasp) for the dual concept approach to judicial
jurisdiction which had been characteristic of the area since Pennoyer. That
dual function analysis is illustrated quite clearly in the statement that:
The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two
related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the
burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure
that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits
imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system. 90
While he acknowledged that fairness restrictions upon judicial jurisdic-
tion "have been substantially relaxed over the years,"91 Justice White took
care to set forth the factors he felt were relevant in assessing the reason-
ableness of an assertion of judicial jurisdiction:
90. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980).
91. Id. at 292.
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Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that the
burden on the defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an appropri-
ate case be considered in light of other relevant factors, including the forum
State's interest in adjudicating the dispute . . ; the plaintiff's interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief. .. ; the interstate judicial sys-
tem's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and
the shared interest of the several States in furthering substantive social
policies ... 92
On its face, that language portends a relaxation of judicial jurisdiction
standards from the narrowly focused concentration on the defendant which
had been a central feature of adjudications since Hanson. The result in
World-Wide Volkswagen, however, belies any such development; it indeed
seemed even more restrictive toward judicial jurisdiction than was pre-
viously the case.
It is possible that the restrictive result in World-Wide Volkswagen came
not from the fairness portion of Justice White's two-part analysis, but rather
from that portion relating to sovereignty. 93 In discussing the sovereignty
aspect, Justice White observed:
[W]e have never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for
jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of
interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution . ... The sovereignty of
each State . . . implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all its sister
States-a limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of the
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. 94
As to the interaction of fairness and sovereignty, Justice White indicated
clearly that both aspects ofjudicial jurisdiction would have to be present for
the exercise of personal jurisdiction to be upheld:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being
forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State, even if the forum State
has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum
State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause,
acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest
the State of its power to render a valid judgment. 95
This language indicates rather plainly that fairness alone would not
necessarily support an exercise of judicial jurisdiction. The sovereignty
92. Id.
93. The source of the result would seem crucial in light of subsequent developments on the Court,
in particular afterlnsurance Corp. ofIreland. It would also be important if there has been a resurrecting
of the sovereignty dimension in Asahi.
94. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293.
95. Id. at 294.
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aspect would have to be satisfied as well. By the same token, a finding of
purposeful availment alone would not necessarily mean that the fundamen-
tal fairness requirement had been met, a conclusion confirmed by Asahi.
The end result in World-Wide Volkswagen was that Oklahoma could not
constitutionally assert jurisdiction. Justice White's vote against Califor-
nia's attempt to assert jurisdiction in Asahi is obviously consistent with his
result in World-Wide Volkswagen, although it seems to me that his vote in
Asahi in favor of purposeful availment recognized the distinction between
the manufacturer in Asahi and the middlemen in World-Wide Volkswagen.
But did that result in World-Wide Volkswagen come from Oklahoma's
having violated the fairness rights of the defendants, or from having
overstepped the bounds of sovereignty, or from both? The distinction
between those two possibilities may ultimately prove to be important, and it
seems not to be clearly resolved in the opinion. Justice White does state that
the defendants in question could not be compelled to defend themselves in
Oklahoma because they could not "reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there, ",96 but that does not clearly settle the question. Was it merely
unfair to hale them before an unanticipated forum or was it an impermissi-
ble extension of Oklahoma's sovereignty or was it an impermissible intru-
sion of Oklahoma upon the sovereignty of some other state? Perhaps as
long as the dual aspects of due process were the foundation for reviewing
judicial jurisdiction cases, the distinction would be unimportant. With the
demise of the dual aspect review (more particularly, with the demise of the
sovereignty portion thereof), the distinction becomes crucial. What is most
puzzling is that Justice White, the author of the opinion laying the dual test
aside (and thereby abolishing sovereignty as a component of the test), is the
very member of the Court who most recently and most forcefully articula-
ted that dual requirement in World-Wide Volkswagen.
Barely more than two years after writing the opinion of the Court in
World-Wide Volkswagen expounding upon the dual nature of constitutional
controls on judicial jurisdiction, Justice White wrote the majority opinion
in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,97 in
which he went to some length to reach the issue of the nature of those
constitutional controls. In a case which rather clearly could have been
decided under the Federal Rules, Justice White chose to gratuitously
observe in a footnote that:
It is true that we have stated that the requirement of personal jurisdiction, as
applied to the state courts, reflects an element of federalism and the character
of state sovereignty vis-a-vis other States .... The restriction on state
96. Id. at 297.
97. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
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sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., however, must
be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by
the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal
jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism
concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism concept operated as an independent
restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it would not be possible to
waive the personal jurisdiction requirement. Individual actions cannot
change the powers of sovereignty although the individual can subject himself
to powers from which he may otherwise be protected. 98
In an earlier portion of the opinion, Justice White discussed the dif-
ference between personal jurisdictional controls and control over subject
matter jurisdiction, which, in the context of a federal forum, "is an Art. III
as well as a statutory requirement; it functions as a restriction on federal
power, and contributes to the characterization of the federal sovereign. "99
In sharp contrast to that idea, Justice White noted that personal jurisdic-
tional restrictions come from the due process clause, thus "represent[ing] a
restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter
of individual liberty." 1° Although he dissented from the majority in
Burger King (which relied on his Insurance Corp. of Ireland statements to
conclude that sovereignty was not a factor in assessing Florida's judicial
jurisdiction), there is no indication that he changed his mind about the
conclusion that restraints on the power of Florida had no component of
sovereignty in them. He simply disagreed with the sufficiency of Florida's
connections.
It is unlikely, ironic, and highly significant that the very member of the
Court to announce a clear dual restriction on personal jurisdiction in World-
Wide Volkswagen would be the member of the Court writing the opinion in
Insurance Corp. of Ireland. That coincidence is too much to pass over,
especially in light of the lengths to which Justice White went in order to
even reach the point in Insurance Corp. of Ireland where he could discuss
the matter in the form of a footnote. If ever dicta could be identified in an
opinion, the footnote in Insurance Corp. ofIreland would qualify. The fact
that Justice White wrote the opinion on the heels of World-Wide Volks-
wagen signals a major change on the Court in regard to the philosophical
underpinnings of the constitutional controls of judicial jurisdiction.
Although Justice White joined in a portion of Asahi which has some
dicta concerning sovereignty, that joinder may be consistent with rejecting
sovereignty as a component of judicial jurisdiction, because the sov-
ereignty language in Asahi is in proximity, to choice-of-law language and
98. Id. at702-03n.10.
99. Id. at 702.
100. Id.
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can be read as related thereto. Even if this portion of Asahi is read as
resurrecting sovereignty, it does so with respect to foreign nations. This is a
context considerably different than that of sister states which occurs in the
typical case in this line under consideration. For myself, I doubt that Justice
White would join in the resurrection of a principle which he had gone to
lengths to lay to rest in Insurance Corp. of Ireland and I conclude instead
that the sovereignty language in Asahi should be read in the context of the
choice-of-law language. Coupled with his vote with the majority in Phillips
Petroleum, I deduce that Justice White has divided sovereignty and fair-
ness, with the former relevant to choice of law and the latter relevant to
judicial jurisdiction. That is exactly the position which should have been
reached years ago. It should now be applauded. It is the logical philosophi-
cal position and should prove much easier to flesh out than the confused
analysis which predated it.
JUSTICE MARSHALL
Justice Marshall was, in the early stages of the period, involved in the
forefront of development of the Court's current position on judicial juris-
diction. In particular, he was influential in reaching the fairly rigid view of
judicial jurisdiction that emerged up through World-Wide Volkswagen. Yet
he seems to have realized that the emerging pattern was too inflexible, and
thus refused to countenance its extension into that case.
In the area of legislative jurisdiction, Justice Marshall's position is more
difficult to pinpoint, since he has not written any opinions. He voted with
the majority to uphold the ability of California to abrogate the sovereign
immunity defense of Nevada in Hall; he also voted with the plurality in
Allstate Insurance, allowing Minnesota to apply its law to the merits of the
case. Those two votes would be consistent with a relaxed view of the role of
constitutional control over legislative jurisdiction. Despite that fact, Justice
Marshall did favor giving more deference to a sister state judgment than to a
pure choice of law question. He voted against allowing the District of
Columbia to supplement the earlier Virginia workers' compensation award
in Washington Gas Light. Taken together, those votes indicate an un-
willingness to use the Constitution as a control on state choice of law
determinations, but to control the state's freedom rather strictly after a
sister state had reduced a matter to judgment. Justice Marshall voted with
the majority in Phillips Petroleum, thus demonstrating that there is, in his
judgment, some limit to state freedom in the choice of law area. This is
confirmed by his joining that portion of Asahi expressing doubts about the
ability of California law to govern the merits of the action.
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In the area of judicial jurisdiction, Justice Marshall agreed with the
majority in Keeton and Calder that the constitutional limitation on such
jurisdiction derives solely from due process.
Justice Marshall's votes in most of the other cases tend to restrict state
jurisdictional authority. In the early portion of this line of cases, he wrote
the majority opinions in three major cases. Those opinions and the votes
they embodied identified him as somewhat restrictive in his view of state
judicial jurisdiction. This attitude, coupled with his voting pattern on the
legislative jurisdiction cases, indicates a desire to control excess state
authority by controlling forum availability rather than choice of law.
In his opinion for the majority in Shaffer v. Heitner, 101 Justice Marshall
reached a conclusion which curbed the ability of states to exercise jurisdic-
tion in in rem or quasi in rem cases if the state lacked otherwise sufficient
minimum contacts with the defendant whose property rights were subject
to adjudication. The basic philosophical position of the majority seems
unexceptional-in reality all litigation is simply about the rights of per-
sons, whether directly or indirectly. It made no conceptual sense to adhere
to the direct-indirect distinction which had prevailed at least since Pen-
noyer. What has always seemed to me to be incorrect about Shaffer is its
result-that Delaware lacked constitutionally sufficient contacts to assert
personal jurisdiction over the directors of a Delaware corporation in a
stockholder's derivative action alleging mismanagement on the part of the
directors. Yet that must be the conclusion, since Justice Marshall explicitly
states that "we will assume that the procedures followed would be sufficient
to bring [defendants] before the Delaware courts, if minimum contacts
existed. '1 02 In examining whether the directors had minimum contacts
with Delaware, Justice Marshall said that the net effect of International
Shoe was that "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on
which the rules of Pennoyer rest, became the central concern of the inquiry
into personal jurisdiction." 10 3
This observation reveals two major points of interest: First, it fore-
shadows the demise of sovereignty altogether as a factor in the cases; and
second, it shows a willingness to focus, in determining fairness, upon
factors other than the defendant exclusively. Unfortunately, in the applica-
tion of that philosophy, Justice Marshall chose to emphasize the contacts of
the defendant directors with Delaware, rather than considering the nature of
the claim and the interest of plaintiffs in securing a Delaware forum. Justice
101. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
102. Id. at 213 n.40.
103. Id. at 204.
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Marshall took the same approach in Rush v. Savchuk.l°4 Relying upon
Shaffer for the proposition that jurisdiction over "property" was strictly
forbidden if a defendant could not personally be subjected to jurisdiction,
Justice Marshall held that Minnesota could not serve as a forum. As in
Shaffer, he limited the analysis to the contacts of the defendant with the
forum. He also ignored the fact that the insurer may have been the real
defendant. If one were to assume that the insured really was the defendant,
the result in Rush is unquestionably correct. If that assumption is incorrect
(as I think it was, given the limitations which had been placed on such
actions in states where they were available), then the decision is unques-
tionably wrong, as no one could have ever questioned that Allstate Insur-
ance was subject to jurisdiction in the forum. The significance of Justice
Marshall's opinion in Rush is difficult to assess. The pivotal question is who
was the defendant-the insurer or the insured. If one concludes that it was
the latter, then the lack of jurisdiction is clear; if one assumes the former,
then the presence of jurisdiction is equally clear. Thus the issue in Rush is
not judicial jurisdiction in the same sense as encountered in the other cases.
The same tendency to focus almost exclusively on the contacts of the
defendant with the forum is illustrated yet again in Justice Marshall's
opinion for the majority in Kulko v. Superior Court. 105 In Kulko, Justice
Marshall admitted that "California has substantial interests in protecting
resident children and in facilitating child-support actions on behalf of those
children. ' 106 Despite the interest of the forum (and implicitly, of the
plaintiff spouse in securing support), the Court nevertheless found it
necessary in such cases that "the defendant's activity is such that it is
'reasonable' and 'fair' to require him to conduct his defense in that
State. 1107 In all fairness to Justice Marshall, it is possible to read his
opinion as saying that there must be some contact with a defendant, no
matter how substantial the contacts of the forum with the plaintiff and with
the claim. In Kulko, the contacts of the defendant were almost nonexistent.
The first three cases--Shaffer, Kulko, and Rush-all indicated a tenden-
cy on Justice Marshall's part to focus almost exclusively on the contacts of a
defendant. While that tendency is the vice of World-Wide Volkswagen, it is
interesting that Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority on the nature
of the contacts of the two defendants who were found to be outside
Oklahoma's jurisdiction. While there is no suggestion in his dissenting
opinion that his disagreement was based on an evaluation of contacts other
than those of the defendants, Justice Marshall felt that jurisdiction could be
104. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
105. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
106. Id. at 100.
107. Id. at 92.
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found from "the deliberate and purposeful actions of the defendants them-
selves in choosing to become a part of a nationwide, indeed a global,
network for marketing and servicing automobiles." 108 In a more philosoph-
ical vein, Justice Marshall observed that "the Constitution forbids the
exercise of jurisdiction if the defendant has no judicially cognizable con-
tacts with the forum.. . . If such contacts are present, the jurisdictional
inquiry requires a balancing of various interests and policies."1 09 This
statement confirms our suspicions about Kulko-some contacts between
the defendant and the forum are necessary. If those contacts are present, a
further jurisdictional inquiry will take into consideration other connecting
factors. If those two steps could be merged, a comprehensive balancing test
to evaluate fairness could be developed, although it is hard to envision a
case in which a forum could proceed based solely on the contacts of the
plaintiff and the claim.
Justice Marshall's vote with the majority in Burger King may indicate
just that sort of evolution in his thinking. Had the focus in Burger King been
exclusively limited to consideration of the contacts of the defendant with
Florida, jurisdiction would probably not have been present. The same two-
part analysis appears inAsahi. Justice Marshall voted that the manufacturer
had purposefully availed itself by placing its products into the stream of
commerce, but felt nevertheless that California was not a fundamentally
fair forum for litigation of the indemnification claim. In reaching that
conclusion, the opinion with which Justice Marshall voted contained (after
its initial emphasis on the nonresident defendant as to purposeful avail-
ment) an analysis considering more factors than simply the contacts of the
defendant.
It appears that Justice Marshall is playing a less active role in this area
than he was in the past. He has not written an opinion on the subject since
1980, despite the fact that he wrote three significant majority opinions
between 1977 and 1980. If his votes on the recent cases are an indication,
he has accepted the direction taken by the rest of the Court. I am reluctant to
conclude too much fromAsahi because its facts are unique. Asahi was more
a contract case than a products liability case due to the failure of the
plaintiff to join Asahi, and the settlement of the underlying tort claim into
which Asahi had been impleaded.
108. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 314 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).




Chief Justice Rehnquist left a very clear mark during his tenure as an
associate justice on the development of the areas of legislative and judicial
jurisdiction; his influence will presumably grow with his control over
opinion writing assignments now that he has become the Chief Justice.
Chief Justice Rehnquist has written a total of five opinions, and his voting
pattern, when examined along with his opinions, reveals a very consistent
position. I might add that, in my opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinions have been of very high quality. It appears to me that his position
has come to sway the rest of the Court. Of particular interest is the fact that
he has combined his own ideas on legislative jurisdiction with those of
Justice Brennan on judicial jurisdiction to form a new consensus on the
Court.
On the subject of legislative jurisdiction, Chief Justice Rehnquist consis-
tently opposed the relaxation of choice of law controls as exemplified by
Hall, Washington Gas Light, and Allstate Insurance. In each instance, he
thought the Court was too willing to put aside federal controls over state
choice of law. He believed that the states had overstepped their legitimate
boundaries in the choices they made. This position is evident from his
published dissents in Hall and Washington Gas Light and from his vote
with the dissent in Allstate Insurance. In particular, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist was concerned in Washington Gas Light (as was Justice Stone before
him) with the fact that allowing a jurisdiction to grant a supplemental award
confused the deference due judgments with the lesser deference due in
unadjudicated settings. 110
What may surprise some about the position of Chief Justice Rehnquist is
that, despite the public perception that he is opposed to federal control over
state matters, his position with regard to legislative jurisdiction is to the
contrary. In every case he has sought to impose federal controls over the
state court's choice of law. While he was unsuccessful in establishing such
controls in the first three cases, it appears that his position has prevailed.
The Court agreed with him that Kansas violated constitutional controls
with respect to certain nonresident plaintiff class members in Phillips
Petroleum. In his opinion for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist found
that Kansas was constitutionally disabled from applying its law on the
merits to such persons despite the fact that it had sufficient contacts to serve
as a forum. While recognizing that nothing in the Constitution automat-
ically compelled Kansas to subordinate its laws to those of other states,
Chief Justice Rehnquist held that "Kansas may not abrogate the rights of
parties beyond its borders having no relation to anything done or to be done
110. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 293 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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within them." 111 As applied to the facts in Phillips Petroleum, this restric-
tion seems especially significant in light of the Court's holding that Kansas
was an appropriate forum for the class action litigation, even for non-
resident class members. In that context, the case seems to be a retreat from
Allstate Insurance. It may mark the reemergence of meaningful controls
over state choice of law. Chief Justice Rehnquist's position in Phillips
Petroleum is consistent with his vote to join that portion of the Asahi
opinion which doubted that California law could have controlled the merits
of that litigation even if California had judicial jurisdiction. That vote in
Asahi further indicates that more factual contacts are required to exercise
legislative jurisdiction than would be necessary for judicial jurisdiction.
Because Chief Justice Rehnquist's position on judicial jurisdiction is
difficult to deduce from his written opinions, his voting pattern must be
examined as well. He was the author of Keeton and Calder, in which he
rejected the argument that assertions of long-arm jurisdiction in defamation
cases were governed by constitutional controls other than due process. His
very clear preference for a bifurcated consideration of the issues was
delineated in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine1 12 where he stated that:
The question of the applicability of New Hampshire's statute of limitations to
claims for out-of-state damages presents itself in the course of litigation only
after jurisdiction over respondent is established, and we do not think that such
choice of law concerns should complicate or distort the jurisdictional in-
quiry. 13
Chief Justice Rehnquist clearly envisions a process in which a court
would resolve judicial jurisdiction first and then examine state choice of
law. Implicit in his vision is a rejection of the proposition that a constitu-
tionally permissible forum can always apply its own law to the merits of the
controversy.
Apart from those two written opinions, one can only deduce Chief
Justice Rehnquist's position on judicial jurisdiction from his voting pattern.
He voted with the majority in Kulko, Rush, World-Wide Volkswagen,
Helicopteros, and Asahi-in every instance to deny state assertions of
judicial jurisdiction. He also voted with the majority in BurgerKing, a vote
that is notable for two reasons. First, the Court upheld judicial jurisdictiorf
despite the fact that a strict application of World-Wide Volkswagen might
have yielded a different result. Second, it confirmed the idea that judicial
jurisdiction is a matter not of state sovereignty but of fairness to the
defendant. Chief Justice Rehnquist's vote in Asahi supported the two-
111. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,822 (1985) (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Dick,
281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930)).
112. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
113. Id. at 778.
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pronged analysis applied in Burger King, although he felt that neither
prong was satisfied in Asahi. His vote on the fairness issue in Asahi is quite
in line with the rest of the Court. That he joined the plurality in rejecting a
finding of purposeful availment, however, still indicates a narrower scope
to his view than other members of the court were prepared to approve. In
regard to the rejection of sovereignty and the upholding of fairness as the
concern of due process, Chief Justice Rehnquist voted with the majority in
Insurance Corp. of Ireland.
What I perceive in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions and voting pattern
is an intellectual nicety of analysis. He seems, more clearly than any other
member of the Court, to distinguish between legislative and judicial juris-
dictional controls. He has differentiated between the two by relegating
sovereignty concerns to the legislative jurisdictional analysis, leaving only
fairness to be determined in the judicial jurisdiction cases. Because of his
prior clarity on that position, I take the sovereignty portion of Asahi in
which he concurred to be related to legislative jurisdiction rather than to
judicial jurisdiction. Chief Justice Rehnquist was in a position to form a
consensus and write the majority decision in Phillips Petroleum, in which
the Court upheld judicial jurisdiction but denied Kansas the ability to
exercise legislative jurisdiction over some of the claims presented in the
litigation. Regarding the difference between the concepts of sovereignty
and fairness, he stated:
[W]e explained that the requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction
comes from the Due Process Clause's protection of the defendant's personal
liberty interest, and said that the requirement "represents a restriction on
judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual
liberty." 114
His delineation is clouded somewhat, however, when, in considering the
legislative jurisdiction issue, he stated that Kansas' attempt to apply its own
law to all of the claims might be "arbitrary and unfair," 115 and constituted
an attempt to "abrogate the rights of parties beyond its borders having no
relation to anything done or to be done within them. "116 Thus one cannot
simply say that fairness is the touchstone of judicial jurisdiction, and
sovereignty the touchstone of legislative jurisdiction. While sovereignty
has been eliminated from judicial jurisdiction, both sovereignty and fair-
ness may still be relevant in legislative jurisdiction. It makes sense to
conclude that, so far as the rights of the litigants are concerned, any forum
114. Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 807 (quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des
Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 & n.10 (1982)).
115. 472 U.S. at 822.
116. Id., (quoting Home Ins. Co. V. Dick, 281 U.S. 387, 410).
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with sufficient contacts to exercise judicial jurisdiction could apply its own
law to the merits, except in cases where application of forum law would
intrude unduly on the rights of a sister state or a foreign country. That
conclusion leaves the two areas analytically separate, but related, and
provides a better framework for the resolution of the issues. Looking at the
result in Phillips Petroleum, I think that the Court's position is pretty close
to this suggestion. I hesitate to generalize too much, since the legislative
jurisdiction issue related to plaintiffs rather than defendants, but I have a
feeling that Chief Justice Rehnquist played a pivotal role in moving the
Court in that direction. What I find especially surprising is that his position
seems to have been derived from that of Justice Brennan-a member of the
Court with whom one would have supposed Chief Justice Rehnquist would
have little common ground.
JUSTICE STEVENS
Justice Stevens has written as many opinions in this line of cases as any
other member of the Court. His position on the issues is clearly identifiable
from his eight separate opinions in a line of only fourteen cases.
Regarding legislative jurisdiction, Justice Stevens' voting pattern and
opinions show that he has consistently sought to maximize the power of the
states to make their own choice of law. He took the position in all four of the
legislative jurisdiction cases that no federal control should invalidate the
particular choice of law which was made by the state court below. Justice
Stevens has consistently reached conclusions directly opposite to those
reached by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Justice Stevens' opinion for the majority in Nevada v. Hall T17 shows his
legislative jurisdiction philosophy quite well. As previously discussed, the
case allowed a California court to deprive Nevada of its sovereign immunity
defense against claims related to a traffic accident which occurred in
California. While allowing that "in certain limited situations, the courts of
one State must apply the statutory law of another State,"' 18 Justice Stevens
stated that "the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a State to
apply another State's law in violation of its own public policy."' 119 As a
generalization, few persons would take issue with either of those state-
ments. This is particularly true if both were qualified by saying that the
choice of applying sister state law or forum law would vary depending upon
the factual connections with the forum state. Beyond that generalization,





however, Justice Stevens made it very clear that, according to his philoso-
phy of federalism, states must be allowed to make their own choice of law,
subject to only very limited intrusion by federal controls:
But, if a federal court were to hold, by inference from the structure of our
Constitution and nothing else, that California is not free in this case to enforce
its policy of full compensation, that holding would constitute the real intru-
sion on the sovereignty of the States-and the power of the people-in our
Union. 120
Framed this way, the choice of law analysis creates a "no win" situation
for federalism. If the Constitution does not prevent California from choos-
ing its own law, then arguably California is intruding on the legitimate
sovereignty of Nevada. If the Constitution does prevent that choice, then
the sovereignty of California is intruded upon by Nevada, since California
would not fully control the consequences of an accident occurring in its
territory. The two possibilities illustrate the broader dilemma of feder-
alism. There is no way to avoid controls on state choice of law because the
attempt to not control the process simply leaves the states free to do as they
please; it is itself a kind of federal approval of their actions. As the
existentialist would say, the failure to choose is itself a choice. Justice
Stevens clearly favors allowing the states to make their own choices. Odd as
it may seem, it is Chief Justice Rehnquist who opts for federal control of
state actions, and Justice Stevens who opts to forego federal controls.
Justice Stevens' other legislative jurisdiction opinions are consistent
with his position in Hall. He was the author of the plurality opinion in
Washington Gas Light allowing the District of Columbia to grant a supple-
mental workers' compensation award despite the fact that no such award
would have been possible in the original forum of Virginia. To do otherwise
would be to make "an unnecessarily aggressive application of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.' 121 Justice Stevens likewise concurred in Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Hague. 122 In that opinion, he distinguished between the
choice of law ramifications of due process and of full faith and credit. As to
the former, he believed that "a choice-of-law decision would violate the
Due Process Clause if it were totally arbitrary or if it were fundamentally
unfair to either litigant." 123 He believed that such a result would probably
never occur if the trial judge decided to apply the law of his own state. 124
Full faith and credit, according to Justice Stevens, simply requires a state to
120. Id. at 426-27.
121. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 285 (1980).
122. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
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respect the legitimate sovereignty of sister states, a requirement not of-
fended by the facts in Allstate Insurance.125 If due process is always
satisfied by the application of forum law, it follows that the only meaningful
restriction on legislative jurisdiction is a negative one. If a state cannot
exercise judicial jurisdiction, neither can it exercise legislative jurisdiction.
Viewed in that fashion, there is no practical federal control on legislative
jurisdiction per se. Consistent with that position, Justice Stevens dissented
in part in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.126 He thought that since Kansas
could serve as the forum for the litigation, there was no reason to restrain it
from applying its own law. In particular, Justice Stevens believed that there
was really no conflict between the laws of Kansas and the laws of Texas or
Oklahoma, and that constitutional control of Kansas' choice was not
appropriate unless there was "an unambiguous conflict with the estab-
lished law" of the other two states. 127
In sum, Justice Stevens very clearly demonstrates a desire to leave the
choice of law process entirely to the states. In such a system, Justice
Stevens' views on constitutional controls over judicial jurisdiction are a
matter of primary importance; essentially, his entire system "defaults" to
that determination. It is especially interesting that Justice Stevens con-
curred in that portion of Asahi which contained dicta that California law
probably could not govern the merits of the action. That position is actually
quite consistent with his prior opinions. While he previously voted against
limits on legislative jurisdiction, each vote was related to a forum which
possessed judicial jurisdiction. It would have to follow from his conclusion
in Asahi that California was not a fair forum that he believed it was
inappropriate for California law to govern the merits of the action.
Early in the line of judicial jurisdiction cases, Justice Stevens was
aligned with the majority of the Court in restraining state judicial jurisdic-
tion. For instance, he was the author of a concurring opinion in Shaffer
which restrained state judicial jurisdiction. In Kulko, World-Wide Volks-
wagen, Helicopteros, and Asahi, he voted with the majority to invalidate a
state exercise of judicial jurisdiction. Justice Stevens voted with the major-
ity in Keeton and Calder, agreeing with the proposition that the control of
judicial jurisdiction in defamation cases came only from due process and
had no relationship to the first amendment. He voted with the majority in
Insurance Corp. of Ireland, agreeing that the constitutional control of
judicial jurisdiction related solely to fairness, and not the respective sov-
ereignty of the states. On the whole, the pattern is consistent with his
125. Id. at 322.
126. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
127. Id. at 841 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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position on legislative jurisdiction. While he was voting to expand the
states' ability to apply their own law, he was also consistently voting to
restrict state judicial jurisdiction. Thus, in Justice Stevens' framework,
judicial jurisdiction became the only meaningful restraint on state author-
ity. This is clearly demonstrated by his concurrence with the Asahi plurality
that California law could not be applied to the merits of the action; having
concluded that California lacked judicial jurisdiction, he had "backed
into" the answer on legislative jurisdiction.
Rush v. Savchuk represents an exception in Justice Stevens' voting
pattern. A vote with the majority there would have continued a trend to
restrain state exercise of judicial jurisdiction. He chose instead to author a
dissenting opinion. However, it appears from his opinion that his vote in the
case was not inconsistent with his philosophy. Rather, he disagreed with
the majority as to who the real defendant in the case was. Instead of
focusing on the tortfeasor and concluding, as did the majority, that since he
was not subject to personal jurisdiction, neither was his insurer, Justice
Stevens viewed the Minnesota jurisdictional scheme as nothing more than a
judicially-created direct action. Since a direct action could be maintained
in Minnesota under an appropriate statute for an accident occurring else-
where, he believed it made "no difference whether the insurance company
is sued in its own name or, as Minnesota law provides, in the guise of a suit
against the individual defendant. 128 His vote in Rush was not an attempt to
relax controls on state jurisdictional power but simply a disagreement as to
which defendant the controls should be measured against. Quite obviously,
there is no judicial jurisdiction problem if the insurer is the defendant. With
that problem solved, Justice Stevens would have had no difficulty letting
Minnesota apply its own law.
When the Court applied a more relaxed standard toward judicial jurisdic-
tion in Burger King, however, Justice Stevens was forced to dissent. On the
surface, his dissent seems to be based only on a disagreement with the
majority about whether the Michigan defendants were sufficiently con-
nected with Florida to make an exercise of jurisdiction fair. Justice Stevens'
vote in Asahi is similar; he applied the majority's methodology, though he
preferred not to reach the purposeful availment issue because he thought it
unnecessary. He then found from the facts that California was a fundamen-
tally unfair forum, despite the existence of proof on the purposeful avail-
ment issue. In Burger King, he thought that there was "a significant
element of unfairness in requiring a franchisee to defend a case of this kind
in the forum chosen by the franchisor." 129
128. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 334 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 402, 487 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Certainly Justice Stevens cannot have been concerned by the fact that, if Florida could serve as a
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Reflection upon Justice Stevens' votes and opinions as a group illustrates
where the Court has been and where it is going. In Shaffer, Kulko, World-
Wide Volkswagen, and Helicopteros, Justice Stevens and the majority of
the Court restricted judicial jurisdiction. During the same period, Justice
Stevens was voting and writing in Nevada, Thomas, and Allstate Insurance
to expand the states' choice of law power. Subsequently, he joined the rest
of the Court in acknowledging in Insurance Corp. of Ireland that judicial
jurisdiction had only a fairness dimension, and in Calder and Keeton that
its control came only from due process. That realization seems to have led
the Court to reverse itself-loosening controls over judicial jurisdiction in
Burger King and tightening controls of legislative jurisdiction in Phillips
Petroleum. The result in Asahi is not a retreat from that position, but is
rather born of unique facts, quite unlike the other long-arm cases; indeed,
the Court's unanimous vote for the result in Asahi indicates a consensus of
opinion. I think this consensus was possible because of the demise of
sovereignty in Insurance Corp. of Ireland.
Justice Stevens, however, did not join the shift of opinion marked by
Insurance Corp. ofIreland. While he agreed with the case philosophically,
it did not alter his position. He continued to avoid legislative jurisdiction
controls and to favor restraint of judicial jurisdiction. Because the Court
had gone the other way, he had to dissent from the results in Burger King
and Phillips Petroleum. Even inAsahi, where the Court unanimously found
that California lacked judicial jurisdiction, Justice Stevens reached his
conclusion on grounds different from those of the other members of the
Court. Justice Stevens' philosophy in the area no longer commands a
working majority on the Court. The Court's current position can be
measured negatively by knowing Justice Stevens' position and realizing
that it has been abandoned. This negative approach indicates that Justice
Brennan's position on judicial jurisdiction has finally prevailed-a triumph
in which Chief Justice Rehnquist has been his unlikely ally.
JUSTICE BRENNAN
Justice Brennan's record is the clearest and best articulated of all the
members of the Court. He is the only current member whose tenure
includes participation in Hanson v. Denckla. Like Justice Stevens, Justice
forum, Florida law would have governed the merits of the case. Given the choice-of-law clause in the
franchise contract, there is little doubt that Michigan (or any other forum, for that matter) would have
applied Florida law to the case. With the existence of the clause, the case presents a pure judicial
jurisdiction question, in the sense that the choice of forum was truly irrelevant to the choice of law. In




Brennan wrote eight opinions during that span of time. The position that
now prevails on the Court in this area emerged from his voting pattern and
opinions. I believe that Justice Brennan has seen his own ideas prevail on
judicial jurisdiction, but has adopted Chief Justice Rehnquist's position on
legislative jurisdiction.
In the area of legislative jurisdiction, Justice Brennan appears on the
surface to have been consistently in the mainstream of the Court. He voted
with the majority in Hall, and with the plurality in Washington Gas Light.
He was the author of the plurality opinion in Allstate Insurance and voted
with the majority in Phillips Petroleum. His plurality opinion in Allstate
Insurance is a low watermark of constitutional controls over state choice of
law. Justice Brennan relied upon the decedent's place of employment, the
residence of the administratrix at the time of the suit, and the presence of
Allstate doing business as sufficient contacts for the application of Minne-
sota law. However, the combination of the three is hardly impressive. The
case represents a virtual abandonment of control over choice of law; the
only real control comes from judicial jurisdiction.
In rather sharp contrast with his position in Allstate Insurance, Justice
Brennan voted with the majority in Phillips Petroleum. That vote supported
the proposition that Kansas lacked sufficient contacts to apply its law to the
merits of the claims of the Texas and Oklahoma residents. Yet the connec-
tion between the forum and the non-residents in Phillips Petroleum was at
least as meaningful as the connection with Minnesota in Allstate Insur-
ance, particularly in light of the fact that Phillips Petroleum was a class
action. Phillips Petroleum represents a retreat from Allstate Insurance, and
a return to some commitment to independent constitutional controls on
state choice of law. This reversal may have been prompted by parallel
developments in the judicial jurisdiction area. As long as his liberal notions
of judicial jurisdiction were rejected by the rest of the Court, Justice
Brennan may have felt it necessary to leave an appropriate forum with the
widest latitude in choice of law. By the time Phillips Petroleum was
decided, Justice Brennan's views on judicial jurisdiction had prevailed.
With the expansion of judicial jurisdiction, he may have believed it was
necessary to restrain the freedom for choice of law he supported in the
earlier era of restricted judicial jurisdiction. This explanation is consistent
with his vote for that portion of Asahi expressing doubt that California's law
could be applied to the merits of the indemnification claim. If California
could not constitutionally serve as a forum, then it would also lack suffi-
cient connection to apply its law to the merits of the case.
In the area of judicial jurisdiction, Justice Brennan consistently believed
that the Court imposed undue restrictions on the states' exercise of judicial
jurisdiction. Prior to Burger King, Justice Brennan only joined the majority
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of the Court on the outcome of the judicial jurisdiction cases inKeeton and
Calder. In every other judicial jurisdiction case beginning with Hanson,
Justice Brennan voted with the minority to uphold state exercises of power.
Justice Brennan voted with the dissent in Hanson v. Denckla for the
proposition that Florida had judicial jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee.
Although he concurred with the philosophy of the first three portions of
Justice Marshall's opinion in Shaffer, Justice Brennan dissented from the
final conclusion that Delaware lacked jurisdiction over nonresident direc-
tors and officers in a stockholders derivative action. In commenting on the
majority's concession in Shaffer that Delaware law could govern the merits
of the case, he noted that "practical considerations argue in favor of seeking
to bridge the distance between the choice-of-law and jurisdictional inquir-
ies."' 130 His resistance to a restrictive judicial jurisdiction philosophy is
also evident in his dissent in Kulko and his joint dissent in Rush and World-
Wide Volkswagen. In each case, he believed the forum could have exercised
judicial jurisdiction. Likewise, he felt that the exercise of general judicial
jurisdiction by Texas was appropriate in Helicopteros.
Yet it would now appear that Justice Brennan's philosophy of judicial
jurisdiction has prevailed. He was the author of the majority opinion in
Burger King, the first true Supreme Court judicial jurisdiction case since
McGee v. International Life13 1 to uphold a state exercise of authority. The
language of his opinion in Burger King seems to echo the language of
majority opinions in World-Wide Volkswagen and Hanson. Yet Justice
Brennan dissented in World-Wide Volkswagen and Hanson. This discrepan-
cy alone would indicate that a shift has occurred. In the opinion, Justice
Brennan restated the conclusion of Insurance Corp. of Ireland that sov-
ereignty is irrelevant to the judicial jurisdictional inquiry. He retained the
purposeful availment dimension of Hanson and World-Wide Volkswagen,
but in an altered form. Justice Brennan's opinion first proposed that it was
necessary to determine whether the defendant had purposefully availed
himself of the benefits and protections of the forum, an inquiry in which the
plaintiff would presumably have the burden of proof. Following this in-
quiry, however, Justice Brennan would allow a defendant to attempt to
persuade the trial court that an assertion of jurisdiction would nevertheless
be fundamentally unfair. In making that assessment, the trial court would
apparently be justified in weighing the respective interests of the plaintiff,
the defendant, and the forum state, a breadth of inquiry not possible under
the original purposeful availment test. While the exact manner in which this
130. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 225 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
131. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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two-part test will work is still uncertain, the conclusion in Burger King is
clear-the Florida assertion of jurisdiction was upheld.
The two-part analysis was followed in Asahi. Justice Brennan, like every
other voting member of the Court, found California's attempt to exercise
judicial jurisdiction to be unfair under the second part of the analysis. That
his victory is not complete, however, is indicated by the very sharp
disagreement among Court members in Asahi on whether placement of an
item in the stream of commerce satisfies the purposeful availment test.
Nevertheless, the result, if not the reasoning, in Asahi shows a consensus
which was conspicuously lacking prior to Burger King. It also shows that
even the very expansive judicial jurisdiction philosophy of Justice Brennan
has some limits.
During the era when his judicial jurisdiction philosophy was rejected by
the majority of the Court, Justice Brennan was willing to acquiesce in the
Court's relaxation of legislative jurisdiction controls in Hall, Washington
Gas Light, and Allstate Insurance. Once his judicial jurisdictional philoso-
phy had prevailed in Burger King, Justice Brennan felt it necessary to
restrain a state's exercise of legislative jurisdiction to a greater degree in
Phillips Petroleum. The coinciding votes of Justice Brennan and Justice
Rehnquist are especially interesting. Justice Brennan was the author of the
judicial jurisdictional opinion in Burger King. He recruited Chief Justice
Rehnquist's vote despite the fact that one would not have expected them to
agree. Chief Justice Rehnquist was the author of the legislative jurisdiction
opinion in Phillips Petroleum. He recruited Justice Brennan's vote, again
despite the fact that one would not have predicted that the two would agree.
Those two members of the Court were also in agreement as to the result in
Asahi, despite disagreement on the purposeful availment question. The
coincidence of those voting and opinion-writing patterns seems to me to be
crucial. I believe they indicate a genuine realignment on the Court. Much
can be deduced about that realignment from the votes and the opinions. I
think it also possible to make some predictions about future conduct of the
Court in these areas.
FUTURE POSSIBILITIES
Viewed as a group, the line of legislative and judicial jurisdiction cases
seems to me to show a pattern. I would like to emphasize that often what is
most important about cases is what they do, not what they say they do. This
observation is especially true of the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sions; for a court with almost total discretionary review powers, its decision
to review a case is significant alone.
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Stripped of all the language, and ignoring the factual differences in the
cases, both the judicial jurisdiction cases and the legislative jurisdiction
cases reveal a pattern which I have attempted to reduce to a graph in the
attached chart. What I find most interesting is that there appears to be a
point at which those two lines "cross." Viewed independently, the pattern
is one of ebb and flow.
In examining the judicial jurisdiction cases, I was persuaded that it is
best to judge the pattern without including Keeton and Calder. I made that
choice because both cases seem easy long-arm cases but for their first
amendment overtones. They contribute more to a restrictive reading of the
first amendment than to fleshing out the dimensions ofjudicial jurisdiction.
I would also exclude Insurance Corp. of Ireland, a discovery case rather
than a judicial jurisdiction case, from the pattern. That case was originally
included in the discussion because of its proximity to World-Wide Volks-
wagen and because of the significance of its footnote.
With those three cases removed, the pattern is quite clear. Every judicial
jurisdiction case from Hanson through Helicopteros resulted in the exer-
cise of jurisdiction being held unconstitutional. The only judicial jurisdic-
tion case since McGee to uphold an exercise of jurisdiction is the most
recent-Burger King. It seems significant to me that the exercise of specific
judicial jurisdiction which was upheld in Burger King comes after the shift
in philosophy which occurred in Insurance Corp. of Ireland. While it is
true that Helicopteros struck down judicial jurisdiction after Insurance
Corp. ofIreland was decided, Helicopteros involved an attempt to exercise
general, not specific jurisdiction. It is significant that the first specific
judicial jurisdictional case reviewed after Insurance Corp. ofIreland is also
the first one in almost thirty years to uphold a state's attempt to exercise
jurisdiction. I believe this occurred because, whether the language in
Burger King supports it or not, the Court has abandoned sovereignty as a
component in judicial jurisdiction cases, thus making it much easier for
states to exercise judicial jurisdiction. It may not be the comprehensive re-
thinking of the theory of judicial jurisdiction some scholars have advo-
cated, but the result is the same, and it was made possible by returning the
sovereignty aspect of Pennoyer to the place from which it emerged some
one hundred and ten years ago-legislative jurisdiction.
Although Asahi strikes down an exercise of jurisdiction, I think its facts
are sufficiently unique to discount its importance, particularly when mea-
suring it against a "normal" long-arm case like Burger King. The settle-
ment of the underlying tort claim and existence of a contract issue between
nonresidents sets it apart from other cases. Additionally, the consensus on
the Court as to result also persuades me that the case is both unique and
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much easier than those previously examined. Finally, I am not concerned
that sovereignty may have been resurrected in Asahi. Too many members of
the Court who previously rejected sovereignty joined in the portion of
Justice O'Connor's opinion containing the sovereignty language 32 for it to
be a retrenchment on judicial jurisdiction.
The pattern in the legislative jurisdiction cases seems equally clear,
although my conclusion is less solid because it is based on relatively fewer
cases. It is tempting to discount both Hall and Washington Gas Light as
irrelevant, since neither is a pure legislative jurisdiction case. Nevertheless
(and for whatever it is worth), the results in the cases are consistent with
each other and with Allstate Insurance. In each of those three instances, the
Court left a state's choice to apply its own law undisturbed. The attenuated
facts in Allstate Insurance in particular might lead one to conclude that
there really was no legislative jurisdiction control being exercised by the
Court, and that judicial jurisdiction was the only meaningful control. Here
again, the pattern changes after Insurance Corp. ofIreland. In the only case
after Insurance Corp. of Ireland-Phillips Petroleum-the Court again
changed what had been its pattern for over thirty years. This time, however,
the Court struck down a state exercise of legislative jurisdiction. Language
in Asahi indicates that a similar result would have followed in that case had
California been able to serve as a forum and attempted to apply its own law.
Thus, the two lines of cases "cross" at Insurance Corp. of Ireland. Prior
to that time the Court was tolerant of ever-expanding exercises of legislative
jurisdiction. It repeatedly struck down state attempts to expand judicial
jurisdiction. Subsequently, the Court has upheld ajudicial jurisdiction case
and struck down an attempt to exercise legislative jurisdiction. I think we
are returning to the basic configuration of the Home Insurance era. 133 This
is not to say that the scope of judicial and legislative jurisdiction will be the
same as it was in 1930. It is merely to theorize than it takes more contacts to
exercise legislative jurisdiction than it takes to exercise judicial jurisdic-
tion. There is certainly nothing in Asahi to undermine that basic con-
clusion; indeed, the language in the case indicated that the improper forum
could not apply its law to the merits--quite a far cry from language to the
contrary in Hanson and Shaffer.
This pattern seems likely to continue as the Court now moves into the era
under Chief Justice Rehnquist. The resignation of Chief Justice Burger and
the addition of Justice Scalia should not change this pattern at all. 134
132. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 11.
134. As this article was going to press, a successor to the position recently vacated by Justice
Powell had not been selected. Although I am somewhat reluctant to speculate on the effect of Justice
Powell's resignation from the Court on my thesis, I believe it will make little difference. I believe that
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Indeed, the Court's most liberal members, Justices Brennan and Marshall,
have played a significant role. My prediction for the future, then, is that the
basic realignment which occurred after Insurance Corp. of Ireland will
continue. The disagreement among Court members on the purposeful
availment portion of Asahi portends rough times ahead in the products
liability area, even when a normal case of victim versus alleged tortfeasor/
manufacturer arises. On the other hand, long arm jurisdiction in products
cases has had a history of developing behind other areas of the law. These
trends will be further illuminated by future case development.
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